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Abstract
The question of what it means to say one knows something, or has knowledge of
something, triggered an epistemological study after the nature of knowledge and its
acquisition. There are many different ways in which one can go about acquiring
knowledge, manydifferent frameworks that one can use to search after truth.
Because most real systems about which one could desire knowledge (organic, social,
economic etc.) are non-linear, an understanding of non-linear systems is important for
the process of acquiring knowledge. Knowledge exhibits the characteristics of a
dynamic, adaptive system, and as such could be approached via a dynamic theory of
adaptive systems. Therefore, chaos theory and complexity theory are two theoretical
(non-linear) frameworks that can facilitate the knowledge acquisition process.
As a modernist instrument for acquiring knowledge, chaos theory provides one with
deterministic rules that make mathematical understanding of non-linear phenomenaa bit
easier, but it is limited in that it can only provide one with certain knowledge up until the
(system's) next bifurcation (i.e. when chaos sets in). After this, it is near impossible to
predict what a chaotic system will do.
Complexity theory, as a postmodern tool for knowledge acquisition, gives one insight into
the dynamic, self-organising nature of the non-linear systems around one. By analysing
the global stability complex systems produce during punctuated equilibrium, one can
learn much about how these systems adapt, evolve and survive.
Complexity and chaos, therefore, together can provide one with a useful framework for
understanding the nature and workings of non-linear systems. However, it should be
remembered that every observer of knowledge does so out of his/her own personal
framework of beliefs, circumstances and history, and that knowledge therefore can
never be 100 percent objective.
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Knowledge and truth can never be entirely relative either, however, for this would mean
that all knowledge (and thereby all opposing claims and statements) is equally correct or
true. This is clearly not possible. What is possible, though, is the fulfilling and
successful pursuit of knowledge for the sake of the journey of learning and
understandi ng.
iv
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Abstrak
Die vraag na wat dit eintlik beteken om te sê mens weet iets, of dra kennis van iets, het
na 'n epistemologiese soeke na die wese van kennis en die verwerwing daarvan toe gelei.
Daar is baie maniere waarop mens kennis kan verwerf, baie verskillende raamwerke wat
mens kan gebruik om te soek nawaarheid.
Omdat die meeste wesenlike stelsels waarvan mens kennis sou wou verkry (organies,
sosiaal, ekonomies ens.) nie-lineêr is, is 'n verstaan van nie-lineêre stelsels belangrik vir
die kennisverwerwingsproses. Kennis vertoon die eienskappe van I n dinamiese,
aanpassende stelsel, en kan dus via 'n dinamiese teorie van aanpassendestelsels benader
word. Daarom is chaosteorie en kompleksiteitsteorie twee teoretiese (nie-lineêre)
raamwerke wat die proses van kennisverwerwing kan vergemaklik.
As I n modernistiese instrument vir kennisverwerwing, verskaf chaosteorie
deterministiese reëls wat die wiskundige verstaan van nie-lineêre verskynsels bietjie
vergemaklik, maar dit is beperk deurdat dit net sekere kennis tot op die (stelsel se)
volgende splitsing (d.w.s.waar chaos begin) verskaf. Hierna, word dit naasonmoontlik om
te voorspel wat I n chaotiese stelsel gaandoen.
Kompleksiteitsteorie, as In postmodernistiese gereedskap vir kennisverwerwing, gee
mens insig in die dinamiese, selforganiserende aard van die nie-lineêre stelsels om mens.
Deur die globale stabiliteit wat komplekse stelsels gedurende onderbreekte ewewig
("punctuated equi/ibrium"}toon te analiseer, kan mens baie leer van hoe hierdie stelsels
aanpas, ontwikkel en oorleef.
Kompleksiteit en chaos, saam, kan mens dus van a nuttige raamwerk vir die verstaan van
die wese en werkinge van nie-lineêre stelsels, voorsien. Daar moet egter onthou word
dat elke waarnemer van kennis dit doen uit sy/haar persoonlike raamwerk van
oortuiginge, omstandighede en geskiedenis, en dat kennis dus nooit 100 persent
objektief kan wees nie.
v
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Kennis en waarheid kan egter ook nooit heeltemaal relatief wees nie, want dit sou
beteken dat alle kennis (en hiermee ook alle teenstrydige aansprake en stellings) gelyk
korrek of waar is. Hierdie is duidelik onmoontlik. Wat wel moontlik is, is die vervullende
en suksesvolle strewe na kennis ter wille van die reis van leer en verstaan.
vi
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Chtlpter 1 : Problem Statement
1.1 Proposed Title
Comparing Complexity and Chaos: The Quest For Knowledge
1.2 Background / Rationale
Humansas a species are knownfor their innate desire to know and understand things.
Whilst this remainsa generalisation, most peopledo desire at least a certain amount of
understanding, even if it is only of certain specific phenomena.
For the everyday person on the street, most knowledge is learnt from those "in a
position of authority". These "authorities" havethis position becauseof their so-called
expert knowledge of a specific subject or field. These kinds of authorities can be
teachers, scientists, politicians or manyother things. They have the authority because
of something they know.
While students all over the world are at last being encouraged to question what
authority figures tell them, andquestion the state of those figures' knowledge,manyof
us still come from the authoritarian/disciplinarian school of being told to be quiet and
listen. The expert's word was considered the only knowledgeon the subject (even if
that expert wasonly in a book).
To question the status of someone's knowledgeone must have some idea of how that
knowledge was acquired. This involves an epistemological study of the nature of
knowledge and its acquisition. Knowledgeexhibits the characteristics of a dynamic,
1
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adaptive system, and as such could be approached via a dynamic theory of adaptive
systems.
In an attempt to accomplish this mammoth task of trying to understand and model
knowledge (at least partly), a framework approach was taken. Two possible frameworks
for acquiring knowledge ~ namely chaos theory and complexity theory ~ were
investigated, for a solid understanding of each, and then each was subjected to scrutiny
as to whether it makes for a good knowledge framework or not. Chaos theory was
considered as a modernist framework, and complexity theory as a postmodern
framework; therefore, a detailed look at modernism and postmodernism and their
respective problems was taken first.
Whilst complexity and chaos theory have had an increase in attention in recent years,
they are still not completely understood. Many feel that complexity is just chaos
masquerading as something ordered, and whilst this is not the belief of the author of
this thesis, it is believed that the two phenomena require closer analysis.
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to consider chaos and complexity theories as
modernist and postmodernist frameworks for understanding the nature of knowledge,
and consider their suitability for modelling the process of acquiring knowledge. Further,
it is to determine what the best framework for acquiring knowledge is (if one exists),
and howone can understand and implement it.
1.3 Preliminary Literature Review
Scientists have long since been motivated to discover and understand all kinds of
phenomena, not merely for the sake of knowledge, but also for power. For with
understanding comes prediction, and with prediction, control. Man (mostly) likes to be
able to control his circumstances; therefore, the more we understand, the more power
we have over our lives.
2
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So what about those phenomenawhich defy conventional understanding? It would seem
that the one who is capable of understanding such phenomenawould hold a great amount
of power over those who do not. This may have been one motivation for the pursuit of
comprehension of complex phenomena, an undertaking that gave rise to what are now
collectively called the complex sciences.
What does it mean for a phenomenonto be complex? Is complexity simply the opposite
of simplicity? There is a certain amount of confusion over the definitions of "simple"
and "complex" amongst users today. Possibly a few distinctions would be helpful here.
Firstly, complex is not the sameas complicated. If one has a system with a number of
intricate components for which one can give one complete description, then that system
is merely complicated, such as with a computer. If, however, the interaction between
the elements of the system, and between the system and its environment cause
understanding of the system to be incomplete after an analysis of the elements, then
the system is complex, as with the humanbrain [Cilliers, 1998: viii].
Nicholas Rescher illustrates this by saying "we [cannot]. .. arrive at a final and definitive
account of the ... structure of the world" [Rescher, 2000: 22]. Possibly surprising to
note here, is that this is much the same as the postmodern view that one cannot find an
overarching metanarrative to describe the world [Lyotard, 1984: xxiv]. This similarity
will be considered in detail later in the thesis.
Secondly, complex is also not the same as chaotic. If a phenomenon (or a system) is
really complex, it is not possible to describe it properly with a simple theory. Also, a
complex system can display chaotic behaviour, and, as will be shown, chaos involves
interaction between a relatively small number of elements, whereas in a complex system,
there is always a large number of interacting elements [Cilliers, 1998: ix]. This means
that a complex system will havea large number of interacting elements, and if it displays
chaos, then this behaviour will be through the interaction of a relatively small number of
those interacting elements.
3
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So what can be considered complex? According to classical physicists, complex
phenomenaare those things that require complex descriptions, and so long as one has
powerful enough tools to do so, describing complexity will not present a problem [Lewin,
1993: 11]. But more recently scientists have shown that this method of approaching
complexity, or more specifically, a complex system, is not sufficient to encapsulate the
whole complexity of the system. For, as will be shown, a complex system consists of
manyelements that interact dynamically with one another and with the environment, and
it is from these reactions that the system's complexity arises. So, to describe the
different elements of such a system would yield merely an understanding of the sum of
the different components of the system, but the complexity of the system would remain
aloof, as it were, for a complex system is not just the sumof its parts, it is much more.
And what about chaos? Some scientists have called this the "irregular side of nature"
[Gleick, 1987: 3], and many have been reluctant to investigate it, or ignorant as to how to
do so. As a result, human comprehension of the disorderly, discontinuous and
spontaneous has been much lacking. Fortunately, many have now realised how important
an understanding of these elements of phenomena can be to our ability to predict or
control behaviour or future events.
The purpose of this thesis, then, is firstly to investigate the nature of humanknowledge
and the tools used to acquire it. This also involves attempting to understand what and
how humans know, and to formulate (if possible) a solution for the best means to attain
knowledge. And secondly, it is to gain a comprehensive understanding of chaos and
complexity theories, and how they may fit into the modernism/postmodernism debate,
as well as how they can assist in the quest for knowledge and understanding.
1.4 Research Problem
Investigate possible frameworks for acquiring knowledge (modernism, postmodernism,
chaos theory and complexity theory), and find the best method for doing so, if one
exists.
4
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1.5 Research Hypothesis
To attain knowledge involves a new understanding of its nature, and a new (non-linear)
approach to its acquisition.
Because most real systems about which one could desire knowledge (organic, social,
economic etc.) are non-linear, an understanding of non-linear systems is important for
the process of acquiring knowledge. And because one desires to acquire knowledge from
such systems, the approach one takes to do so should represent the systems in some
fundamental way. Knowledgedisplays the properties of a dynamic, adaptive system, and
could therefore be approached by means of a theory of systems that model this
behaviour. It is for this reason, then, that a non-linear approach to knowledge
acquisition is necessary.
1.6 Chapter Outline
1.6.1 Modernism and Postmodernism
Firstly, modernism and postmodernism as theoretical frameworks are discussed, with
reference to culture and society. Specific focus is given to how each of these
approaches the knowledgeacquisition process.
1.6.2 Chaos
Secondly, a detailed discussion of the phenomenon and science of chaos follows, with an
introduction to dynamical systems. Why chaos can be considered to be a modernist
knowledge framework, and how this framework can assist in the overall quest for
knowledge, is examined.
5
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1.6.3 Complexity
In the third chapter, complexity theory and complex systems are discussed. Why this
theory can be deemed postmodern is considered, as well as how it can help in the
process of acquiring knowledge. Finally, a comparison between complexity and chaos is
made.
1.6.4 Conclusions
In the final chapter the previous three chapters are integrated, where the discussion
focuses on what has been discovered and what one can learn from each of the
theoretical frameworks considered in the previous chapters, concerning the
epistemological pursuit of this thesis. Which of these frameworks provide one with the
best background for acquiring knowledge; is it one, all or a combination? What has been
learnt about knowledgeand the possibility of its acquisition?
These questions are addressed in the final chapter, and a proposition is put forward
(tentatively) as to how one should approach knowledge acquisition. Finally, the question
of whether complexity is merely ordered chaos is also addressed.
6
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Clttlpter 2 :ModerIlis". tmd PostmoderIlis".
2.1 Introduction
As humans,we have an innate desire to inquire after things; to find out what things are
and how they work. This desire has taken human society - led by thinkers and
scientists the world over - on a quest of discovery; a voyage to discover knowledge.
But what is the nature of human knowledge? And how is it that we come by this
knowledge? What is necessary for beings like humansto understand the world in which
they live?
There have been many different frameworks through the ages with which people have
tried to explain or describe the world that they live in. Many have appeared to be fairly
successful; or at least, they have seemed to concur with the empirical evidence at hand.
Often, though, these seemingly accurate theories have comeup short when newevidence
has been unearthed. Does this mean that one must discard previous theories? Or
simply adjust them?
Questions such as these, and their implications, make up the main focus of what is to
follow. Therefore, it is important to first take a look at the phenomenaof modernism
and postmodernism, for both are vital for a further understanding of the problem of
(satisfactorily) seeking knowledge.
Modernism and postmodernism both need to be understood as legitimate philosophical
and intellectual frameworks. Without this understanding, one will struggle to truly grasp
the implications of specific phenomena- especially complex phenomena such as chaos
and complexity - and will not be able to participate in philosophical, academic or even
general discourse on most contemporary subjects.
7
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Therefore, this chapter takes a closer look at what modernism and postmodernism are,
how they arose out of the modernist and postmodernist ages respectively, and how
society and culture were structured during each of those times. Because knowledge of
science, systems and networks becomes important when studying chaos and complexity,
how modernism and postmodernism approach these subjects becomes important as well.
For the purposes of this thesis, it is essential to have a firm understanding of the two
phenomenaof modernism and postmodernism before one tackles chaos or complexity,
for it will later be argued that chaos can be seen as an instance of modernism, and
complexity as an instance of postmodernism. Therefore, both the good points and bad
points of modernism and postmodernism are highlighted, remembering always, that on a
journey of discovery such as this one, knowledge (of something specific) is not the
ultimate goal; rather, an understanding of the activity of pursuing knowledge is and
should be sought.
How then, can manunderstand the world he lives in? By understanding what it meansto
know something, and considering the suitability of the theoretical frameworks by which
this can be done. Let us therefore firstly consider modernism.
2.2 Modernism
2.2.1 History
The modernist era was characterised by quite a dramatic change in human thinking. In
the pre-modern era, manwas an integral part of nature, he shared a natural connection
with a divine or transcendent Nature that included and gave life to all living things
[Trainor, 1998: 134]. Nature was the system in which all life shared a universe on equal
grounds. Pre-modern man believed in absolute truth and the supernatural. They formed
the basis for his worldview, the foundation for his reality as a universe [Fields, 1995: 5].
8
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In the modernist era, instead of belief being founded in the mythical, as it had been in
the pre-modern era, people began to place more and more belief in science. This
happened because people began to realise that the myths most had organised their lives
around were, for the most part, unprovable, and therefore could not be considered facti
(truth, reality); for fact implied verifiability.
For example, in the sixth century before Christ (most) people believed that the earth
was flat. It was "fact" to them, because it appeared flat. And even when Pythagoras,
(and later others such as Aristotle and Euclid), observed the curvature of the horizon,
and concluded that the earth had to be spherical, it was some time before the theory
became fully accepted [Russell, 1997: par. 5].
Philolaus, Pythagoras' student, took the first step towards proving that the earth is not
the centre of the universe, a theory knownas heliocentricity, although his version was
still - for the most part - mystical [Plant, 2002: par. 2]. Later, Aristarchus of Samos,
who lived in the third century B.C.and was also of the Pythagorean school, realised that
the movements of all the celestial bodies could be explained if one assumed that the sun
is the centre of the universe, and not the earth, but for a long time, heliocentricity was
rejected by most people, even scientists [Plant, 2002: par. 3,4], for people were
reluctant to relinquish their hold on their religion, or should it be the hold their
religion/mythology had on them. For people believed what they could see, and what their
(particular) mythology told them to believe.
Of course, the fact that the Ptolemic universe - the theory where the planets and the
sun revolve around the earth, named after ClaudiusPtolemy [Landry, 1998: par. 1] - fed
man's ego by naming him as the centre of the universe did not do much for the
promotion of heliocentricity either.
Many, many years later, however, in the sixteenth century, a Polish mathematician by
the name of Nicolas Copernicus was studying Pythagorean mathematics when he
1 A foef is "a statement or assertion of verified information about something that is the case or
has happened" [WordWeb dictionary]; a "truth verifiable from experience of observation"
[McLeod,1986: 301].
9
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discovered a technical imperfection in the Ptolemic universe theory [Plant, 2002: par.
16]. He realised that the only way to fully and accurately explain the universe and the
motions of the heavenlybodieswasto placethe sunat the centre of the universe [Plant,
2002: par. 16].
Even though Copernicuseventually published his findings, the "literally earth-shaking
implications of the Copernican revolution did not begin to emerge until the work of
Galileo and Kepler at the beginning of the 17th century" [plant, 2002: par. 19; BBCi,
2002: par. 8]. Becauseof the radical change this revelation brought to science, it is
considered by manyscientists and laypeoplealike to be the dawnof the modern age of
science; a time of fact, when logical, rational and objective theories with universal
applicability are sought after.
Modernity could be seen as a "critique of religion" [Milbank, 1992: 30], where, if a
phenomenon(or theory) cannot be proved scientifically, then it is not considered true or
even worthy of concern. What people believe (their particular mythology) is not
necessarily the truth, or does not necessarily coincide with empirical evidence, and it
was this realisation that madethem turn to science.
But there has beenmuchdebate about the actual starting point for modernity, and not
much consensus. Although most believe it to be somewhere around 1776, with the
American Revolution, or 1789, with the French Revolution, there are those who take
modernity's onset back as far as 1436, whenGuttenberg first used moveabletype, or
forward to as late as 1895, with the publication of Freud's Interpretation of Dreams
and the rise of modernism2 in literature and the fine arts [Toulmin, 1990: 5].
Although it may be difficult to pinpoint exactly when modernity began, the shift in
principles behind the culture of modernism is less difficult to see. On the whole, the
movement from the pre-modern to the modern reflected a general shift from the
practical to the theoretical [Toulmin, 1990: 34].
2 There is a semantic difference between the concepts of "modernity" and "modernism".
Modernity refers to the specific historical period classified as "modern", whilst modernism refers
to the typical modern culture of the time. The same distinction can be made for "postmodernity"
and "postmodernism".
10
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Modern theories - as opposed to those of for example the Renaissance humanists
before them - need(ed) to be logical, rational, objective, and above all, universal. This
was to ensure their scientific-ness, and to essentially secure truth. Whereas the
Renaissance humanists concentrated on an oral means of communicating, modernists
began to shift the emphasis of communication to the written, which meant that logic
became more important than rhetoric. Pre-modernists focused on the particular, the
local and the timely, for such was their world and their experience; but modernist
theorists were more interested in the universal, the general and the timeless [Toulmin,
1990: 30-33]. Permanence and objectivity became sought-after standards, but with this
came a much more theoretical approach to life, culture and science.
The permanent (and universal) theory that modernists are interested in is that theory
that does not fold when time and/or circumstances change. It is the theory that is
scientific, and therefore rational and objective; but more than that, it will hold true
today, tomorrow, in ten years' time; here, on another continent, anywhere in the
universe.
After being faced with the realities of life that Copernicus' revelation brought to the
world, many scholars realised that if one did not know that some theory would hold at
any time, in any place, then nothing could actually be said about that theory; or,
conversely, anything could be said about it.
For example, if I were to say that water boils at one hundred degrees Celsius, but that
this will only occur when I boil the water now, and not at any other time, then I am
actually not saying anything true about the properties of water, for if water boils at one
hundred degrees Celsius, it must do so at any time, and in any place. This theory (that
water boils at one hundred degrees Celsius) must be universa/for it to be true.
For the shapers of modern society - politicians, academics etc. - this "universally
applicable rationality" was very important as a social structure, for it created the "unity
and certainty of a worldview", which in turn led to the stable environment of a society
who all thought and acted the same [Luhmann, 1998: 18, 20, 26]. And this same could
then of course eventually be dictated by those in power.
11
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2.2.2 Modernism in Philosophy
According to Deely, "classical modern philosophy began in the writings of Descartes",
with the rise of Rationalism [Deely, 1994: 15]. Descartes called humansunique, rational
beings, who should be true to their nature and search for the knowledge that would
provide them with a secure foundation [Linn, 1996: 2].
In the pre-modern era, much of this search was focused on being - what is real and
exists apart from us. But with modernists like Descartes, although the focus was still
on being, it began to move away from that which has being, to what one (one's mind)
does to understandbeing [Deely, 1994: 16].
... the key to knowledge... [liesJin rational reflection rather than in empirical
observation [Scruton, 1981: 37J
This shifted philosophical reflection towards rational discourse; hence Deely's (above)
statement.
With this shift came the start of the attention given to method, commonof a" modern
theoretical and/or scientific inquiry. It was Descartes that most actively pursued the
"ideal" of method, because for him this would place philosophical argumentation on a par
with the natural sciences (especially geometry) [Burnham & Fieser, 2001: par. 6, 10, 11],
and would make conclusions drawn from such argumentation just as reasonable, certain
and scientific as those from the empirical sciences.
He divided a" things about which man can have knowledge into two groups: "... first,
things which have existence; second; external truths which have no existence outside
our thoughts ..." [Kenny, 1993: 177]. These are the only things that humans can know
about; therefore, the only knowledge man must strive towards is knowledge about these
two things. Anything else is mere speculation and therefore it is irrational to claim to
have knowledge (certainty) of it.
For Descartes, reason was the "foundation and guide for pursuing truth" [Burnham &
Fieser, 2001: par. 10]. For without reason, manwould never be able to attain the kind of
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conclusivenesshe could with the natural sciences. And because of his strong background
in mathematics [Burnham & Fieser, 2001: par. 6]. Descartes saw reason as the tool to
reaching scientific certainty in anydiscipline:
Reason is a universal instrument, which can be used in all kinds of situations
{Morris, 1971: 178J
Descartes believed that if one desired knowledge or truth, (on any subject), reason had
to be the way one went about accomplishing this. Reasonable method would give any
knowledge gained from any subject a scientific validity that other paths (to knowledge)
could not provide.
Between 1619and 1629 Descartes developed his theory of method, which was eventually
published in a book entitled Rules for the Direction of the Mind [Burnham and Fieser,
2001: par. 6, 14]. The twenty-one rules contained in the book deal with the different
aspects of his (new) method of inquiry [Descartes, 1985: 9-76], which utilised a
deductive approach, and focused on using reason the right way [Descartes, 1960: 17;
Burnhamand Fieser, 2001: par. 14].
Later, Descartes condensed his twenty-one rules of Rules for the Direction of the Mind
to a mere four [Descartes, 1968: 1], which he considered the most important and the
most inclusive. These were later published in what is arguably his best-known work:
Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking the Truth in
the Sciences (1637) [Descartes, 1985: 109,111]:
1. Do not accept what one does not have "evident knowledge" for as
truth, i.e. only accept what one cannot doubt {Descartes, 1960: 15J
2. Divide the problem one faces up into as many (simpler) parts as one
can or needs to solve it better {Descartes, 1960: 15J
3. Think orderly about the problem: start with the simplest components
(those about which one knows the most), presuppose some order
between the components, and then proceed step by step up that
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order, towards "knowledge of the most complex" {Descartes, 1960:
15J
4. Be sure to leave nothing out: be complete and comprehensive
{Descartes, 1960: 15J
According to S.V. Keeling, these four rules are based on three mental operations:
intuition, deduction and enumeration. Together, they make up the faculty of human
reason [Burnham & Fieser, 2001: par. 21]. Intuition means to directly glean what the
simplest components of the problem ("subject matter") are [Burnham and Fieser, 2001:
par. 21]. Deduction involves "inferring [the] necessary relations" between these
components [Burnham and Fieser, 2001: par. 21]. And enumeration is the process of
reviewing used when deductions have become so longas to possibly cause error [Burnham
and Fieser, 2001: par. 21].
When one has discovered that (one's) old theories are not quite accurate any longer,
Descartes suggests that one preferably begin methodically building them up from
scratch, rather than attempt to renovate them over and over again - much like the old
parts in a city [Burnhamand Fieser, 2001: par. 15]. If one renovates too much, one may
struggle to see what a particular (old) building was supposed to look like; also, it makes
the building that much more unstable with each new renovation - rather like a patch job
done on an old pair of jeans. But by starting from scratch, one is able to recognise and
accept much new information, which could help to build new (and better) theories of
knowledge:
And just as in tearing down a building we usually retain the debris to help build a
new one, so in destroying all of my opinions which seemed to me ill-founded, I
made many observations and acquired much experience which has since aided me
in establishing more certain knowledge {Descartes, 1960: 22J
Descartes' method of doubt, which led him to claim, "cogito ergo sum": or, 'I think,
therefore I am', implies that certainty can only come from doubt. One must destroy all
"knowledge" that cannot be definitively established, and start from a basis of that
which can be unquestionably determined.
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Modernism therefore "... seeks to reduce the burden of ... 'irrational' phenomena..."
[Milbank, 1992: 31]. It is not rational to say that one has knowledge by means of one's
tradition, belief or religion. These sources cannot supply certain knowledge. Modernism
makes an attempt to show that these "knowiedges" are based in error (or at least in an
ignorant comprehension of how knowledge is acquired). Reason(as the ultimate weapon
of modernism) fails when traditional, mythical 'knowledge' is claimed to be 'real
knowledge'.
Modernist philosophers reacted in much the same way as other modern intellectuals
when it came to the credibility and universality of their theories. They too realised that
this scientific way of thinking (and investigating) led to greater intellectual certainty,
and so a kind of "theory-centred style of philosophy" was born. When philosophical
problems were posed or arose, solutions were then sought in timeless, universal terms.
Descartes, Locke and Leibniz were all "theory-centred" (modern) philosophers [Toulmin,
1990: 9-10].
For philosophers and scientists alike, scientific method therefore became the ultimate
theoretical (and practical) construct, for it is rational, sensible and stepwise, and
produces a large amount of scientific surety when applied correctly.
Unfortunately, the modernist's devotion to reason and science caused him to turn
reasonable method into a religion, resulting in precisely the same unscientific error that
he had been arguing against (the lack of scientific credibility of religion) [Linn, 1996: 6].
Because modernists considered reason and science to be so important in the attempt to
acquire knowledge or even 'truth', reason became the all-important faculty for truth.
So reason was privileged above any other meansof acquiring knowledge, and in doing so,
modernists turned scientific method into a religion, with reason as its god [Montuori,
2004: par. 4].
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2.2.3 Architecture
Modern scientists, sociologists and philosophers vied with each other to come up with
the best "scientific" (or true) theories - whether historical, cultural or academic - to
describe the nature of man and his progress. The pervading culture of general society
(modernism) began to reflect this shift towards the scientific, and this is best seen in
the architecture of the time.
The modernist movement in architecture (and other fine arts) began around the 1890's,
with the beginning of the so-called style of "art nouveau", by the likes of Charles Rennie
Mackintosh in Glasgow,and Otto Wagner and Josef Hoffmann in Vienna [Toulmin, 1990:
155]. Architects such as Mies van der Rohe and Walter Gropius began to create
structures that were logical, anonymous, timeless and indistinguishable [Toulmin, 1990:
6; Cahoone, 1996: 13]. But above all, these buildings had to be functional and
featureless; as architect Adolf Loos said: "any design should show us what the building is
for" [Toulmin, 1990: 155].
A modern house, for example, could be seen as a large, rectangular block separated into
smaller square or rectangular blocks, each with its specific function. Doors were
situated in such a way that they provided an equally rapid exit from all rooms, and rooms
such as kitchens or bathrooms were located as centrally as possible. Modernist
structures are therefore designed to optimise functionality and resources, and they
contain no specific, individual identifying marks; for the architects of the modern era,
this epitomises the scientific character of modernism.
Modernism was not only seen in modern architecture, of course; all the art genres of
modernity reflected the modern approach in some or other way. Painters such as
Gustave Courbet and Claude Monet's realist and impressionist paintings [Cahoone, 1996:
13] respectively showed the modernist interest in the scientific and the structured, and
in the music world, composers such as Arnold Schonberg and Alban Berg's use of
atonality in musical works [Cahoone, 1996: 13] not only expressed pervading feelings of
their war-affected time, but also illustrated the influence of modernism on the arts
particularly well.
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According to Bauman,modern art was a "desperate attempt to purify the work of the
artist" [Bauman, 1992: viii]: words, colours, shapes and sounds were considered
pollutants, and therefore the ultimate modernist painting became a blank canvas, the
ultimate written piece an empty page, and the ultimate musical composition, silence
[Bauman,1992: viii].
2.2.4 Modernist Society
Modern societies are madeup of three separate realms: technical-economic, political and
cultural. Each of these realms had their own area of modern life to govern, and their
own principles on which they did this.
The technical-economic realm worked on the principle of economising, or that old
capitalist motto of maximisation of profit. This of course led to "specialisation and
hierarchy" [Bell, 1976: 320], for if one's goal is to make as much money as possible, then
business and life will tend to become organised along the lines of who has the knowledge
and skills to get one that money,and who does not.
Thus businesses became bureaucracies, and people became things. As a part of the
economic work force, one was forced to accept the fact that one was no longer an
individual, but merely the walking, talking form of one's function. No matter how high up
the economic hierarchy one found oneself, one still remained "the manager", "the
lawyer" or "the cleaner". Needless to say, this gave people an immense feeling of
isolation and general non-importance.
The second realm of modern society was the domain of the ruling or governing entities in
that society, the political realm. In a democracy, this realm is (supposed to be) based on
the principle of equality [Bell, 1976: 320], creating and preserving a culture of free and
equal rights. It is the job of the modern government to regulate conflict, ensure the
safety of its citizens, and protect the (equal) rights of all members of the society.
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Unfortunately, this often means intervening in the economic and socio-cultural realms -
to ensure the equal treatment of different peoples or cultural groups - which usually
leads to frustration and ill feelings all around.
Although the ideal behind modern government still remains a noble one, most people have
found that the modern political realm's application of this ideal considers some of its
people to be 'more equal than others' .
The third and last realm of modern society is the cultural realm. As with all societies, it
is here that culture, norms and traditions are established, but, unlike preceding
cultures, the modern cultural realm is based on the principle of self [Bell, 1976: 320].
This is the idea of, 'what can this do for me?' Though most would not care to admit it,
the majority of members of the modern society act only when they expect to profit in
some way out of that action. People work because it willmake them money, they give in
to extra demands from their superiors because they believe it may earn them respect or
a promotion. They help or give to charities because it makes them lookor feel good.
Almost every instance of cultural interaction in the modern society reflects the
expression or gratification of self, and it is in this way that the individual becomes the
most important entity in modern society. Although it can hardly be called surprising, for
the individualreceives no recognition in either of the other spheres of modern life.
Is it really all that remarkable, then, as the self becomes what Daniel Bell terms the
"touchstone of cultural judgement" [Bell, 1976: 322], that the cravings, urges and
impact of the immediate experience, the Now, become all-important in modern society?
The question to ask of this, however, is if this is our culture, what is to stop it becoming
our reality? The impact of this immediate gratification of the self - if allowed to
become the dominating social reality - could easily turn society into a culture of
murder, lust, rape, perversion; in essence, a culture of inhumanity [examples: Bell, 1976:
322].
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This emphasis on self, however, was not always a destructive thing. Most saw it as the
Western ideal: autonomous man becoming self-determining. But to do this, man realised
that, quite aside from immediate experience, he needed to increase his knowledge of
himself, others and his surroundings.
It did not take the modernist political and social leaders long to realise, though, that
with knowledge comes control, and so it was also not long before this led to a furious
striving for autonomy. For if society has the knowledge, it must be able to determine its
own values, customs and traditions without any outside interference or help [McGowan,
1991: 4]; it would be able to be an independent society, and the power to control that
society would rest with those who had the knowledge to do so.
The trouble with such thinking is that it helps to establish hierarchies that lead to
oppression. For whilst early modernists may have had such noble objectives as unity and
national identity in mind, certain people that followed took this search for singleness and
identity a bit far. Their obsession with unity caused them to disregard anything and
anyone that did not fit in with their idea of what was "right" or "ideal" [Cornell, 1992:
33], alienating and even discriminating against such "other invasions".
The reasoning behind such prejudice is that "only unified, homogeneousentities ... can act
effectively" [McGowan, 1991: 20]; and there one has modern racism, sexism and other
discriminatory practices. Hitler's systematic yet rapid elimination of the Jews in
Germany is just one example of how the ideals of modernity went astray. He wished to
"purge" the Germans of any "destabilising" link that could weaken the (in his mind)
"ultimate race" through their 'otherness'.
For modernists, then, there is just one kind of social order: that which stems from the
"science" of prediction and control that comes with knowledge and power. And,
therefore, there is also only one valid view of the world: a grand narrative, one that
reflects this (social) order, i.e. an ordered totality [Bauman, 1987: 3]. For it is only in
the unification of the world under the universality of science that this world can exist.
Science must be objective and universal, and the world must be based on this objectivity
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and universality, otherwise it would fall apart. And the only true way for us to live is to
do likewise: to base our lives on the knowledgeof the objective and the universal.
2.2.5 Knowledge and Reason?
Much of the scientific character of architectural structures mentioned above was
achieved through technologisation, or the application of technology to everyday life, but
whereas architecture was the functional application of the modernist "scientification",
and technology was the means of accomplishing this, the underlying ideal behind it all
was Reason: "inquiry based on the human faculty of grasping necessary connections"
[Linn,1996: 2].
Not just reason, but Reason with a capital R, because when modernists placed science in
a preferenced position, they put reason on a pedestal: the pedestal of ultimate Dictator.
For what could not be reasoned through, could not be proved, and was therefore
rejected as being unscientific. And what could be reasoned, could be proved, and could
therefore claim scientific status.
The modern man did not need the supernatural to guide him; reason and science alone
could give him the answers he needed to understand the universe and structure the
world.
Of course this knowledgeof the scientific brought with it power - the power to dictate
what is true and right and to thereby shape society - for when all believe the same, all
think the same, and when all think the same, all act the same. This produces control for
those controlling the knowledge. Anything not objectively verifiable should be rejected,
for it "distort[s] knowledgeand limit[s] effectivity of control" [Bauman,1987: 3-4].
The modern view of knowledge, therefore, means "having the ability and the right to
define and systematise reality, so as to judge it" [Brennan, 1995: 100]. It wouldappear,
then, that the more knowledge one acquires, the greater one's control, and the bigger
hand one can have in shaping society to a universal, one-minded entity. Or so say the
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modernists. A society of citizens who all think the same, act the same, and do not
question the superior knowledge of their leaders ---Joyal, law-abiding citizens? Or
robots?
National loyalty and patriotism, and civil obedience are good results of the above control
of knowledge by modernists. But is this what happenswhen citizens are called to think
and act the way their leaders prescribe, merely because they say so, even if those
leaders have noble reasons for asking them to do so? It may be. But it may also
possibly get out of hand, as has been seen at certain times in humanity's history. Does
this control of knowledge, and ultimately of people, lead to progress and pride, or
another possible holocaust?
Towards the beginning of the twentieth century, many people began to value
modernism's prescribed, indistinguishable way of thinking less and less, and what with
democracy aiming to protect the rights and views of the individual, more and more
people began to look towards something less restrictive than modernism as they knew it.
So where did this leave society? The individual - as a product of mass production
(where everything is made on a large scale, and each product looks exactly like the next)
- sometimes became not much more than a puppet; powerless, on the end of the power-
wielding modernist string. Whomever had the knowledge had the power to prescribe
how people should be, and individuals who looked, acted or were even slightly different
from the prescribed ideal were often rejected, alienated and discriminated against.
Many in power believed in the modernist "unity" ideal so much that they were willing to
go to any lengths to ensure its preservation. Many horrendous practices continued to
victimise people in a time of modernist "purification", not least of which apartheid and
the Jewish holocaust. Allowing modernism as it had become to continue would eventually
destroy all creativity, individuality and freedom, leaving only a world of robots. It had
to change, or else be replaced by something else entirely.
And so, many individuals, in different places and in differing ways, began to move away
from what they saw as the sameness, the functionality, the restrictiveness of
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modernism. Creativity and individualism began to be important again. This attitude,
along with the realisation of modernism's limitations, paved the way for what came to be
knownas postmodernism.
This is not to say, however, that modernism has ended. Although many individuals feel
that modernism is restrictive and needs to be adapted at least; on a practical level,
much of the ideal of modernism still remains around the world today. There are still
groups, peoples and even nations very much tied to the values of modernism, where
modernism is still the dominant modus operandi. A good example of this is the nation of
the United States of America.
2.3 Postmodernism
2.3.1 History
Before the term "postmodern" became relatively well known - towards the latter
stages of the twentieth century - there were a number of scholars from various fields
already using it, though their specific references differed quite widely.
German Rudolf Pannwitz, a la Nietzsche, described the nihilism of (early) twentieth
century Western culture as postmodern in 1917 [Cahoone, 1996: 3]; Frederico de Onis,
the Spanish literary critic, referred to the reaction against literary modernism in 1934
as postmodern [Cahoone, 1996: 3]; in 1939, the English theologian Bernard Iddings Bell
called for a return to religion on account of "the failure of secular modernism", which he
labelled postmodern [Cahoone, 1996: 3]; whilst at the same time, his countryman
historian Arnold Toynbee termed the rise of mass society following World War One
postmodern [Cahoone, 1996: 3].
In the 1950's and '60's, literary critics labelled reactions against aesthetic modernism
postmodern [Cahoone, 1996: 3], and in the 1970's, architects (such as Robert Venturi)
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[Toulmin, 1990: 6] also reacted against aesthetic modernism, building structures that
were less functional, had much decoration and local colour, and were more aesthetically
pleasing. This style became knownas "postmodern".
There have been those, such as Jencks, who date the end of modernity (and hence the
beginning of postmodernity) very specifically. Jencks claims that modernity crashed to
its death at thirty-two minutes past three on the afternoon of July fifteen, 1972, when
great slab blocks of the 1950's St. Louis Pruitt-Igoe Housing project were demolished
[Huyssen, 1984: 359]. This building exemplified all that modernism had stood for - it
was the functional, logical, optimal use of a small amount of space, so that as many
people as possible could live in the small, boxlike apartments - so for people like
Jencks, its demolition was symbolic of modernism's fall, and the progression to
something new (and by implication, better).
Although the exact date (again, if there was one) of the beginning of the postmodernist
era is uncertain, there was a definite, noticeable shift in the mood or ideas of late
modernist scholars.
After the second world war, artists began to attack the institution of Art, with its
strict, rigid, functionalistic ideas, and tried to include more integration of colours and
shapes into their works as well as their lives [Huyssen, 1984: 363].
A new technological optimism began to emerge, as post-industrial society enthused over
newmedia: television, video and the computer [Huyssen, 1984: 363].
A culture of validation began to take form: in everyday life, individuals previously
classed as "outside" of the institutionalist norm were validated, affirmed and generally
accepted [Huyssen, 1984: 363]. No longer was the modernist mass culture the norm, but
rather a culture of multiplicity and diversity began to develop, in which tolerance and
acknowledgment played a vital role.
As people eventually realised that the tension between tradition and innovation could no
longer be ignored, and the discontinuity between the conservation and renewal of the
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social order no longer disregarded, new frontiers were sought in attempts to expand the
views and organisation of society, as well as the boundaries of knowledge [Huyssen,
1984: 363,371].
2.3.2 Postmodemism in Philosophy
In the 1980's, when philosophers began to call the French poststructuralist movement
of the 1960's - which denied the possibility of objective knowledge and the unity of
the human self [Cahoone, 1996: 2,3] - postmodern, postmodernism as a philosophical
position and a cultural movement, began to gain acceptance. 1980's philosophers, who
were uneasy about modern rationalism, utopianism and foundationism, declared society
"post"-modern, and called for movement against and away from modernist focuses.
The modern faith in human reason, which, through rational science, leads to objective
truth, was one of the first problems for postmodernists.
Is it really possible for a subjective being (such as a human) to objectively observe
anything at all [ROsen,1994: 188; Brennan, 1995: lOO]? One's eyes can certainly deceive
one, for the world appears flat when it is in fact spherical, and it is also possible for
science to fail; for the most careful experiment to yield incorrect, inaccurate or even
impossible results. Is knowledge at all possible in the light of human subjectivity? For
many theorists, therefore, it seems unlikely that truly objective truth can be gained.
By the end of the twentieth century, "postmodern" had become a buzzword; people were
throwing the term about as a sign of social progress, and applying it to everything from
micro-machines to relationships. Postmodern philosophy, however, came to be
recognised by these five, somewhat reactive (to modernism), themes [Cahoone, 1996:
14]:
2.3.2.1 Representationand construction:
There is nothing that is immediately present to one; all is dependent on one's
interpretation thereof. Unlike the modernists, who privilege presence,
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postmodernists focus on representation: how humans represent phenomenaand
occurrences to one another through signs and concepts; and construction: the
products that they make from these representations [Cahoone,1996: 14].
2.3.2.2 Phenomena:
It is not (as modernists claim) possible to see "beyond" a phenomenonto its
origin or foundation. There is therefore nothing "deeper" than the
phenomenon itself. It is not possible to return to, recapture, or even
represent the origins of phenomena; indeed, this is not necessary, for all that
one needs to understand a phenomenon is the phenomenon itself [Cahoone,
1996: 14].
2.3.2.3 Plurality:
The world is pluralistic and indeterminate. Everything in it is constituted by
relations to other things. Therefore nothing is simple, obvious or totally
present to us, and analysing it will only yield part of the whole, part of the
truth [Cahoone,1996: 4, 15].
This theme is like the parable of six blind menwho all encountered an elephant.
One touched its trunk and said it was a snake. Another touched its side and
said it must be a wall. A third felt the tail and said it was a rope, and a fourth
felt the leg and said it must be a tree. The fifth man touched the elephant's
ear and claimed the thing they were encountering to be a fan, and the last man,
when touching the elephant's tusk, argued that it had to be a spear [example:
Cahoone,1996: 12].
What these men did not know was that they were all touching different parts
of a very large animal. Each of them was in a sense right, for their particular
part. But what this story illustrates is the postmodern theme of plurality: any
one part cannot be the whole elephant; anyone part of modernity cannot claim
to be the whole [Montuori, 2004: 5]. That is where the modernists went wrong.
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An analysis of anyone part of history, anyone instance, anyone phenomenon
cannot yield the whole truth. The world is plural, and so must philosophy be.
2.3.2.4 Immanenceof norms:
The norms we live by today are not transcendent, they are subjective products
of the processes they govern [Cahoone, 1996: 15]. Is it just, for example, to
kill a man? Immediately one answers, "No, of course not, that is why there are
laws against such things!" Is the norm of justice not then transcendent, above
all processes and circumstances of justice, the same at all times and in all
places? It may appear so. But killing a man may become just when he is
terminally ill, if one believes in euthanasia, or if he is a convicted, dangerous
criminal, if one believes in the death penalty. And so the lofty norm of Justice
falls from its transcendental, societal pedestal, where it should never have
been put in the first place. Norms are immanent: dependent on the
circumstances and people involved, and not transcendent.
2.3.2.5 Constitutiveotherness:
That which modernism marginalised, excluded, cast aside - i.e. "the other" -
in postmodernism is privileged, made the centre and studied for the knowledge
it can provide [Cahoone, 1996: 16]. For what modernism privileged, what it
considered important, could only be constituted through not being the other
[Derrida, in Cornell, 1992: 70].
For example, what is presence but a lack of absence, and what is a system
other than what is not outside its boundaries? If one could not define a
system in terms of what may not be inside its boundary walls, there would be no
system. This modernist process of excluding or repressing that which is seen
as secondary and unimportant, is therefore self-undermining, for without the
"other" there could be no primary, "important" phenomena[Cahoone,1996: 16].
For postmodern philosophers, it is important to realise that there is not just one point
of view in any given circumstance. The meaninganyoneascribes to any situation is based
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on their interpretation of the factors governing that situation, and is also affected by
their environment, background and relation to the situation [Johannessen et. nl., 2002:
16]. Plurality is important [Aronovitch, 1995: 322]. just as remembering that certain
rules may needed to be amended at times, to fit the circumstance.
This does not mean that nothing can be scientific anymore. It merely means that our
definition of science needs to be redefined. Scientific method can no longer remain the
objective, universal, observable method of modernism, governed by a modern analytic
reason.
Nature is inherently disorderly [fields, 1995: 5]. not orderly as the modernists claimed.
Therefore, uniform scientific method cannot apply to the study of nature or of man.
Rather, a new kind of method for studying science is needed, one in which reason
becomes a synthesis of modernism's analytic reason and pre-modernism' s myths; a
synthetic, aesthetic, dynamic reason [Gier, 2000: par. 8].
An example of this kind of reason is found in virtue. Virtue is a unity of fact
(modernism), value (pre-modernism) and beauty (pre- or postmodernism) [Gier, 2000:
par.8].
Postmodernists see the world as fragmented, changing, discontinuous [Beck, 1993: 5].
Because it is constantly changing, and because people are also dynamic, changing beings,
reality becomes in part a human creation. People mould their reality according to their
needs, and out of their perspective, culture, background etc. There can never be one
complete, specific, all-encompassing description of nature, the world, reality, life... or
anything at all.
Thus, postmodern philosophers are suspicious of traditional or conventional conceptions
of truth, reason and objectivity, and see the world as contingent, ungrounded, diverse
and unstable. Whereas modernism tried to formulate "ultimate grounds of explanation",
grand narratives which "legitimate all other discourse" [Eagleton, 1996: vii; Lyotard,
1984: xxiv; Montuori, 2004: par. 3], postmodernism does not need or want such 'meta'-
27
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
narratives. It is, as Lyotard said, "incredulity towards metanarratives" [Lyotard, 1984:
xxiv].
The postmodern philosopher does not wish to unify all knowledge; rather, he desires a
large variety of discourses (local narratives) all existing together, because for him, each
describes something legitimate and worth knowingin itself, and the process of acquiring
knowledge is more important than the knowledge itself [Brennan, 1995: 100].
Postmodernism, therefore, has to do with a "radically altered view of knowledge"
[Brennan, 1995: 100].
It is also not important to know the origin of phenomena, for though context is
important to the postmodernist, it is the context in which one observes the phenomenon
now that matters. One can in any case never claim to knowthe origin of some thing, for
it has passed; one was not present at that origin. It is also not necessary to legitimate
other discourses, for they justify themselves within their own contexts.
2.3.3 Media
Postmodernism as a theoretical framework has manyapplications in everyday life. There
are many ways and many places in life today where one can actually see postmodernism
at work - in art, in the ethos of acceptance and tolerance propagated by some groups
or governments, in the importance given to marginalised groups, in the plurality and
disjunction of fused cultures in society - and, not least of all, in today's media. Every
person living today is affected by postmodern media in some or other significant way.
One cannot get away from it. Should this fact threaten us, or excite us:> Is today's
media good or bad:>
Although the respective pros and cons of postmodern media make up an important
ethical debate, how one judges the impact of the media is not as important as
acknowledgingthe change it has brought to our lives and our world [Schirmacher, 2000:
par. 1]. Most people today would be unable to live without the media in some kind of
form, though they wouldprobably be reluctant to admit it.
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Think for example, though, of September 11, 2001. A great majority of people
worldwide would not have knownabout this tragedy had it not been for the media, and
would certainly not have been able to follow the developments that ensued. Things
happen so fast today that man relies on the media to keep him up to date and informed,
even though he may not be present to what is happening, or much influenced by it.
One's life could therefore be much simpler, and much slower if there were no media.
Instead, one is thrown about from one story to the next, trying to comprehend and
react to each before the next one comes, and brings with it new names, new events and
newemotions to observe, experience and sort out.
So what can postmodernism offer one in one's quest for knowledge? It is a way of
looking at, and describing, the world we live in. One could view the world out of a
modernist perspective, and one would then see it as a uniform, scientific phenomenon, to
be understood rationally and reasonably. The modernist seeks to understand the world
he/she lives in as objectively as possible; and this is done by formal scientific inquiry.
For the postmodernist, the view is a bit different. He/she does not necessarily seek to
understand the world, but rather to experience it. The postmodernist realises that the
world is not uniform, and experiences of it will not be universal. Therefore, how one
views the world is much more of a subjective experience, rather than based on objective
discovery. Each person will represent the world based on his/her experiences, and each
of these representations is valid for the context in which it operates. There is no all-
encompassing, over-arching viewof what the world is.
A demand, therefore, for absolute certainty or truth of how the world is, completely
devoid of any subjective influencing factors, is not only unwarranted, it is unreasonable.
Absolute certainty (in this way) does not exist, and science therefore is not universal in
that the explanations it offers are not universally valid. Indeed, this is the reason for
scientific progress, for if scientists always accepted that any explanation science
produced was universal, there would be no need for further inquiry.
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French philosopher Jean Baudrillard referred to postmodern man as "living in an era of
rapid and constant change brought about by the electronic media" [Frisch, par. 4]. As an
example of this postmodern media, consider television. What does television today
convey to the general public? Does it, as Heath and Skinner claim, relay reality as it
happens,without selection, control or mediation; a real transmission of the real world, as
sociologists Kroker and Cookmaintain [Media Ethics ..., par. 5, 9]?
Or does television - and media in general - feed its viewer an artificial reality tainted
by whatever subjectivity is present at the time; a simulation which subtly forces him to
buy into the deception placed before him [Media Ethics ..., par. 37]? There are somewho
think the latter.
McLuhan, for example, describes television as a "subtle, maleficent, elusive twisting of
meaning" [Media Ethics ..., par. 41], and Baudrillard considers postmodern television to be
the "final stage before culture disappears into the control of the image" [Media
Ethics ..., par. 5]. The media image then becomes the substitute for reality; television
transforms real into hyperreal, an intensification of reality, a simulation that is more
real than the real itself [Media Ethics ..., par. 32,49].
It may be easier to accept this simulation if one realises that the act of simulating is
not a new phenomenon. Western culture at least has gone through many of what Gone
terms "phases of cultures of accumulation" [Gone, 1991: 94].
During the Renaissance, nature competed with what was seen as fake or simulated
nature. In the Industrial era, the natural and the mass-produced product vied for the
consumer's attention, and in post-Industrial time, people must distinguish between what
is real and what is hyperreality [Gane, 1991: 94].
Most of US would like to claim that the media portrays reality as it actually is, but as
there are always people involved in observing, experiencing, editing and presenting it, it
is relatively near impossible for media to depict a completely objective reality. As Eco
said, any person's perception of things is always already affected by his/her background
and emotions towards that which he/she perceives, which could lead to distorted or
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even false knowledge [Media Ethics ..., par. 35]. Therefore, media news is shaped by the
world it attempts to convey, and the viewing public has no control over the amount of
valid truth it receives from these representations [Media Ethics ..., par. 6, 10].
According to Baudrillard, this simulation of reality that the viewer is given begins with
what he terms an "implosion of meaning". This occurs when the distinction between
active and passive becomes blurred [Frisch, par. 15]. No longer does man experience
reality first-hand, and decide for himself the validity of the truth portrayed before
him; now, he is no longer present to the truth, and the media becomes free to present as
"truth" whatever pleases the camera and producer. In doing so, the unsuspecting viewer
is made a "passive machine" [Media Ethics ..., par. 5, 49], accepting and believing that
which is put before him/her, whilst "technology ... obscures ... real and false, and merges
fantasy [and] reality" [Frisch, par. 4].
The distinction between the simulation and reality, the copy and the original, is gone.
The viewer assimilates the simulation into his/her life usually without even knowing it,
and before long, what he/she wants is the simulation, and not the real [Media Ethics ...,
par. 38,40].
Many people would call this brainwashing, indoctrination, manipulation or at least
distortion of the truth. But, as Baudrillard realised, simulation does not hide the truth,
it is the truth that hides the fact that there is no truth [Taylor, 1992: 19; Media
Ethics ..., par. 30]. There is no depth, no perspective to Truth [Gane, 1991: 102]. Reality,
and hence truth, is what onemakes of it. Or in this case, what the media makesof it.
But, as most people are not completely gullible, they would most likely recognise the
media image as an inaccurate simulation if they just thought about it long enough.
Media's answer to this problem, says Deleuze, is repetition. Repetition is extremely
important for the media to retain a sense of the real [Media Ethics ..., par. 49]. If it did
not at least appear to resemble reality, no one would buy into it, and the media (the
postmodern media at least) would die out.
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That is why advertising is so important to the media industry. Advertisements not only
provide a glimpse of reality "as it should be", causing the viewer to immediately want
whatever is advertised, but with constant repetition comes conditioning to believe that
what is advertised is real. Also, the more the media bombards one with the same
"reality" over and over again, the less time one has to truly consider the merits of what
it claims.
One of the main effects of media's "representations" of reality in television, film,
advertising etc. is the obscuring of the boundary between public and private. The media
is everywhere, and therefore what was once private, becomes public.
Take for example the paparazzi photographers who constantly invade the privacy of
celebrities in the hope of getting a good picture to sell to the media. The media then
prints the picture (because the public wants to see it, of course), and it is the public who
get to invade the private lives of those celebrities.
On the other hand, the media plays just as important a role in causing the public to
become private. When there is a war taking place somewhere in the world, or some
terrible event such as September 11thoccurs, the media is always there to bring these
public horrors right into one's living room, whether one wants it there or not.
Baudrillard calls this interchanging of the public and private an "obscenity" [Media
Ethics ..., par. 25], and it is not all that surprising why. No one is safe anymore; life
becomestelevision, and television becomes life [Media Ethics ..., par. 31].
An interesting example of this is the reality-television show Big Brother. For the
housemates, whatever privacy they thought they had, or would have, is completely gone.
Television makes their whole lives public to the entire country, and as far as the public is
concerned, they (the public) have to contend with the invasion of the antics of the
housemates into their homes, possibly even for twenty-four hours a day. The
housemates' lives become television, and this television becomes part of the lives of the
general public.
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Howdoes the media accomplish all of this? According to Schirmacher. there are four
rules of the media game. The first. and most important. is to keep the focus on the self
[Media Ethics .... par. 11]. The media screams. "take care of yourself!" and this is
advocated especially by its advertising. All advertisements are aimed at the self. aimed
at make one's life better. "Use this miracle cream": "eat this new cereal": "buy this
type of shampoo". .. all these imply that if one buys that specific product. one will look
better. feel better. be more popular. more successful and more important.
Besides advertising the necessity of lookingafter oneself. the media also challenges the
viewer to create his/her own life [Media Ethics .... par. 12] - for example with
camcorders. which can record and edit events in one's life exactly as one wants. for
future use; with answering machines. on which one can place a message specifically
formulated to create a certain impression of oneself; and with films. the greatest
freedom to truly create life and reality as one desires - but at the drop of a hat the
authority of the media can take over. An important world event. an international sports
meet. a national arts festival; all will find the media's time, space and money given over
to these events.
Why does this happen? The simple answer is money. It is the ultimate goal of the media
industry - just like any other business - to make money. and whatever it takes to make
people watch. this is what it will concentrate on. The working rule of thumb "if it
doesn't look good, nobody will buy it, and you willbe out of a job" can be considered the
media's motto. and every instance of media proffered to the public has to abide by this
law;news. wars. world events included [Media Ethics .... par. 13].
Rule number two defines performance as the moment of truth [Media Ethics .... par. 13].
The media metaphors of speech, print and television especially define this (postmodern)
world. Through Baudrillard's hyperreality, the simulation of an extra-real reality, one
becomes involved in what Eco called "the pleasure of imitation" [Media Ethics ..., par. 13].
Though one may not always be aware of it. one becomes conditioned to the simulation
presented to one. and eventually. the simulation becomes better than the reality. One
desires to imitate the simulation. not reality. Therefore. the media must present that
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simulation in such a way that the viewer does not recognise it as a simulation. and
desires to become like it.
The third rule of the media game concerns style. Style is the mediumof action. and the
media "seduces by style alone" [Media Ethics ...• par. 14]. Style is that which produces
action on the part of the viewer. for without it. he/she would be bored. uninterested.
and completely apathetic towards the media and its proponents. How boring the media is
to the viewer becomes the only deciding factor in whether or not he/she accepts its
simulatory performance. and desires to partake of its illusion.
Therefore. it is by style alone that the viewer is convinced that he/she wishes to act.
Television becomes tele-action [Media Ethics .... par. 14]. and style persuades the viewer
that the media is not making a machine or robot out of him/her. but merely making
him/her more "with it". more intelligent. more creative. happier. and ultimately. more in
control of his/her own life.
The fourth and final rule of the media game states: "mediation is the flow of media"
[Media Ethics ...• par. 14]. This means that media can only be truly authentic as a
mediator. Much of the three previous rules has focused on what is important from the
side of the media; what must be done to make it work. This final rule is concerned with
howmedia can contribute in a real and positive way to the lives of its viewers.
The media not only gives one access to events. places and emotions otherwise beyond
one's reach. but it also connects one to its inherent process.
With the media as a mediator. two worlds are connected in one instant: the past and the
present. the present and the future. the knownand the unknown. the accessible and the
inaccessible. the possible and the impossible. the real and the simulation. The symbolic
exchange of the real for the hyperreal is controlled by the media's "hierarchised
systems" - systems that manipulate the movement of signs. The media is "power
through control over exchanges" [Gone. 1991: 94].
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2.3.4 Postmodernist Society / Culture
Every society in the world has a different way of structuring, running and ordering its
people and their culture, though these could be divided into a limited number of groups,
such as democracy, socialism, communismetc. Societies and cultures have also changed
over time, and each one could be said to have had its good points and bad points, just as
each society today can be considered good in someways, and bad in others.
Pre-modern and modern societies share a culture of hard labour, power struggles,
oppression and exploitation. In traditional societies, much emphasis was placed on
family, community and tradition, but there was not a lot of individual freedom, and the
people were often very poor, both materially and socially [Eagleton, 1996: 107]. There
was a general "lack of self-critical awareness" because of the prescription through
myths and traditions, and this social collectiveness emphasised by the community
[Degenaar, 1993: 53].
In the later modern societies, human equality, universal rights and "free individual
development" became very important, but as people fought to gain independence and
wealth, and to rise up the corporate ladder, relationships deteriorated, until they were
neither significant, caring nor meaningful [Eagleton, 1996: 107].
With the rise of postmodernism, some people began to realise that freedom, equality
and wealth were all very well, but what has happened to brotherhood? Men worked
themselves almost to death to "move up in the world", and gain all they desired, only to
find that this did not (as they had expected) make them happy. Kinship, community and
something to believe in had made pre-modern societies strong in a way modern people
could not understand, and this is only now beginning to dawn on manyof them.
Not that all modern ideals are bad; on the contrary, some are very lofty; they can just
not be all there is to life. It would appear then, that the postmodern view of culture
calls for (in a sense) a limited change: change that incorporates the best of all preceding
attempts at organising society and culture; change that brings the best out of man, both
individually and corporately.
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2.3.5 Relativism
And so, to some, postmodernism represents an escape from, or a break with, theology,
metaphysics, racism and domination [Cahoone, 1996:1], whilst for others it is an
endeavour to do away with western civilisation; and for still others, merely a collection
of vague writers talking about nothing [Cahoone,1996: 1].
These, of course, are not the only views of what postmodernism is - it can encompass
all that is good in opposition to the negativity of modernism, all that is bad in a drastic
attempt to move away from modernism's mistakes, or any combination of the two - but
the mere presence of such differing views indicates that postmodernism cannot be
boxed; no grand narrative can be written on what postmodernism is or should be.
Some might accuse postmodernism of relativism, arguing that this (above) point is
exactly an indication of just how relativistic postmodernism actually is. Relativism is
"...the thesis that the natural world and such evidence as we have about that world do
little or nothing to constrain our beliefs" [Laudan, 1990: viii], and according to the
Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, proponents of relativism usually purport that "all
points of view are equally valid" [Westacott, 2001: par. 1], and what anyone person or
group of people think or believe is relative to their specific framework or standpoint.
So, (according to German Georg Simmei), nature, history and all other 'truth
descriptions' gain meaning only in the light of one's own particular perspective [Avey,
1954: 228]. In other words, truth independent of one's point of view does not exist
[Kirk, 1999: 10,11]; it cannot be "out there" as Richard Rorty said, independent of one's
mind [Kirk, 1999: 11].
There have been many descriptions of relativism, by people for and against it, but
probably the most famous or most encompassing description was given by the Greek
philosopher Protagorus: "Man is the measure of all things: of what is, that it is, and of
what is not, that it is not" [Kirk, 1999: 37]. In other words, man decides what is to be
truth and what is not. Whether this is a valid description of how things are or not,
remains to be seen.
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For relativism to work, three major points have to be understood. Firstly, the character
of relativism is what is known as a/ethic, which means to do with the nature of truth
[Margolis, 1991: 3]. So relativism is a theory or framework by which one could try to
understand what truth is.
Secondly, the conditions under which relativism works are known as "favourable
épisrêmic [knowledge] conditions" [Margolis, 1991: 3]. To create these conditions, one
must assume that man can (is able to) grasp (the) truth about the world.
And thirdly, a limit must (from the start) be placed on the theory of relativism: one
must also assume that reality is inherently unchanging, otherwise it would be almost
impossible to knowanything about it. This is known as the ontic [being] constraint of
relativism.
The above three aspects of the theory of relativism - the alethic character, the
épistëmic consideration and the ontic constraint - encompass the most important issues
of the theory, and together are knownas the archie canonof relativism [Margolis, 1991:
3].
If truth really is relative, and all points of view equally valid, as relativists claim, then it
makes sense that there wouldbe a large number of differing types of relativism, each as
'valid' as the next, for no one theory (of relativism) could claim to be 'more correct'
than the next. Of the types of relativism discussed below, all arose from either a
strong connection with, or a strong rejection of, the archic canon.
2.3.5.1 Culturalrelativism:
Cultural relativism, as it is called, is derived from contextualising the archic
canon. Proponents of this type of relativism believe that because people
perceive things differently from within their differing cultural frameworks, it
is not correct to claim a universal truth or absolute, for truth will differ for
each person because no two people's cultural and sociological backgrounds are
the same [Margolis, 1991: 14]. If two or more people happen to agree on some
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truth, cultural relativists claim that this is only because they have reached
agreement out of some commoninterest or for some commongoal.
Truth, therefore, becomes merely "a product of short-term localised
consensus belief" [Norris, 1997: 1]. If, for example, two people believe that
the earth is round, then they have merely both decided that it is best for
themselves to believe supposed photographs from supposed scientific
authorities.
2.3.5.2 Strongsociological form of cultural relativism:
There is also a stronger form of cultural relativism, put forward by Gaston
Bachelard, known as the strong sociological form of cultural relativism.
Bachelard claims that "scientific truth ... [is] just the ... title bestowed on those
language games (or metaphors) that best fit in with the beliefs, social policy
interests, or ideological self-images of the age" [Norris, 1997: 26].
This also implies that those in authority have the power to decide what these
"self-images of the age" are, and therefore to decide what "scientific truth"
is, although it is unclear whether Bachelard intended this form of relativism to
have this effect or not.
2.3.5.3 Least form of relativism (LF):
This type of relativism also has a connection with the archie canon, in that it
abandons what is knownas the principle of excluded middle, or (in formal logic)
the law of bivalence. Certain concepts that do not make sense without an
understanding of their opposites - such as 'up' and 'down' - form a
"conceptual polarity" (with their opposites) [Honderich, 1995: 691], and are
known as bipolar oppositions. In the law of bivalence, bipolar oppositions are
applied to truth-values, such as 'true' and 'false', where there can be no other
option between the polar opposites. Therefore, something is either true or it
is false; there is no third option, no middle way. This is knownas the law of
excluded middle [Honderich, 1995: 257; Margolis, 1991: 18].
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In the least form of relativism, (IF), this law is done away with, making room
for many-polared truth-values. Something need not be merely 'true' or 'false',
it can be 'true for me', 'true at such-and-such a time' etc.
2.3.5.4 Protagoreanism:
Protagoreanism, after the Greek philosopher Protagorus, integrates the least
form of relativism, which abandons the principle of excluded middle, with a
strong rejection of the archic canon [Margolis, 1991: 18].
2.3.5.5 Subjectivism:
The subjectivist claims, "whatever seems to me to be true is true, and
whatever seems to you to be true is true" [Kirk, 1999: 37]. But this is
impossible, for if what is true for one person is the opposite of what is true
for another person, contradiction occurs.
For example: I believe that the earth is round. Someone else believes that it is
flat. It seems round to me; therefore, according to subjectivism, it is round.
But it seems flat to the other person, and therefore must be flat, according to
subjectivism. This is a contradiction. The world cannot be both round and flat.
logically, there cannot be contradictions.
Protagorus' answer to this problem was what he termed "true-for-me"
relativism. This is simply: there is "no such thing as truth full-stop; ...only truth
for people at times" [Kirk, 1999: 38]. So the earth is not necessarily round or
flat, its roundness or flatness is not truth per se, because this does not exist;
rather, the statement 'the earth is round' is true for me, or for most
educated people, etc.
But if one is to attempt to take Protagorean "true-for-me" relativism seriously,
one comes across a glitch in this theory. If the statements 'it is true for X
that the earth is round' and 'it is true for Y that the earth is not round' are
both true, then it appears that there is disagreement over facts (about the
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earth). For if it was merely what each person believed about the existence and
shape of the earth, then the matter wouldmerely be one of differing tastes.
The disagreement over facts implies a distinct realist attitude towards the
existence and shape of the earth; i.e. they do not depend merely on what one
believes of them. Therefore, what is true is independent of what one believes
[Kirk, 1999: 41-43], and Protagorus' "no truth per se" falls flat, along with his
type of relativism.
2.3.5.6 Strongandweak relativism:
Lastly, it is important to distinguish between strong and weak relativism. The
underlying relativistic scepticism at what 'evidence' can do for what one
believes to be true remains the focus, but the intensity of that scepticism
differs. Weak relativism maintains that evidence can sometimes not allow or
help one to choose between certain opposing theories, whilst strong relativism
purports that evidence can never allowor help one to choose between any pair
of opposing theories [Laudan, 1990: 55-56].
In the light of the journey of knowledge on which we have embarked, what does
relativism entail for attempts at describing the world? The modernist social order, that
of prediction and control, falls away with postmodernism; for none can say their order is
the correct or best kind of order. Order is not a priori, and there are therefore an
infinite number of models of order to choose from [Bauman, 1987:4]. No one is more
'right' than any other one.
If truth is governed by what one believes, and what one believes depends on a specific
frame of reference, who gets to supply that frame of reference used to describe the
world? If the answer, generally, is humans, then this would imply that humans share a
commonframe of reference, and the base of relativism collapses.
If it is a government, society or group that provides this frame of reference, then not
only is the ordinary man's truth being prescribed for him, but the agenda of the group is
bound to affect its viewof how the world is and what truth should be.
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If, however, every individualis to decide for him-/herself what the world is like, then it
stands to reason that there would be any number of conflicting views of the world, for
the way one sees the world depends on one's experience of it, and conflicting
experiences would lead to conflicting representations of the world [Ayer, 1982: 3,251].
As Protagorus said in the fifth century B.C:"... [our] opinions... are always personal and ...
based upon... [our] immediate sense perceptions" [Avey, 1954: 18]. Therefore, how one
represents the world is based on one's experiences of the world, and those experiences
are based on one's (individual)perceptions of it.
It may seem logical, then, to ask howone decides which one is accurate, but the question
is misguided. None of these representations of the world could be accurate, for, in the
end, they remain representations [Ayer, 1982: 251]. And to return for a moment to the
archie canon; if man can glean the truth about the world, and if that world is and
remains unchanging, then to say that "truth" means only that which is true for a certain
perspective is preposterous! For if one can know the truth about the world, and it is
unchanging, then surely one has arrived at some kind of knowledge which is true
irrespective of one's framework or point of view.
It appears, then, that relativism has 'shot itself in the foot', so to speak, right at the
beginning of its attempt to legitimise itself [Margolis, 1991: 3].
Relativists do not believe in absolute truth (or any absolutes for that matter), and
consider reality to be contingent and immanent [Saugstad, 2001: 2,3]. For, (as
Ferdinand c.s. Schiller said), man can only ever form an opinion (on something); nothing
is ever absolute or final, for the perspective of the experiencer of truth affects
his/her view thereof [Avey, 1954: 244].
The problem with this view is that if everything really is just a 'matter of opinion'
(which is of course based on one's frame of reference) then all views are really equally
valid, and nothing is preferable to anything else [Laudan, 1990: 162-163]. "To rape is
a/ways good" then becomes just as true and valid a statement as "rape is wrong/~for
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example; and the realist's view that ''relativism is false" is just as true as the
relativist's insistence that "relativism is right" [Westacott, 2001: par. 1].
Also, the relativism defence statement "there is no absolute truth" is surely an absolute
in itself [Avey, 1954: 242]; and the statement "persons exist independently of what
anyone may think" is true no matter whether anyone believes it or not. But if the
relativist refuses to take this (above) statement as truth, then he considers himself the
only intelligent being there is, and falls into solipsism [Kirk, 1999: 44].
So whilst it may be a noble ideal to never privilege one particular viewpoint above
another, clearly, the above problem illustrates that not all contradictory viewpoints can
be equally valid, and when one insists on no absolutes, one finds oneself committing
precisely the error of absolutes one wishes to eliminate.
For a matter of interest, is it really possible to live without absolutes? If knowledge is
truly dependent on one's perspective [Saugstad, 2001: 2], what happens to morality?
Man will be able to act as unethically as he desires, and simply blame it on his viewpoint!
A world without some form of control or guidelines that work in many situations tends
towards anarchy, and although man is free to change them when they no longer work, it
is still vital that they be in place whilst they do work.
And although many of these guidelines may be specific to a particular context, is it not
possible that there are at least some that may be applicable everywhere? Whether or
not there are remains to be seen, and may also be subject to individual opinion, but the
possibility that someabsolutes do exist, still remains.
It is unlikely, therefore, that philosophy (be it postmodernism or something else) can do
without some kind of universal principles or absolutes [Morawski, 1992: 54]. This would
be to destroy itself, its people and the world.
So how, then, does a postmodernist choose what is best for any particular circumstance?
By evaluating the possibilities against criteria set up for that particular circumstance.
One cannot evaluate what lies outside the boundaries of the tradition or framework
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[Cornell, 1992: 70] in which one is; therefore, only the specific tradition or case is
important and relevant at that time.
In this way relativists are similar to postmodernists. Both do not believe in "universal
exceptioniess truths" (absolutes) [Margolis, 1991: 20, 195], and both believe that
meaning is in some way determined by interpretation. But postmodernism is not
relativism. It is merely context-specific. This does not mean that "anything goes". It
means that each individual case or phenomenonmust be judged on its own merits, the
merits of its particular context.
But if relativism is true, what is to become of the notion of scientific development? Is
it progress or merely change? If one is directed to such an extent by one's cultural,
sociological and physical environment, how can one ever be sure of any kind of
objectivity?
According to the relativist, one cannot. Science is not absolutely objective; it is "a
social and humanactivity" [Laudan, 1990: 147]. Lakatos said: "The direction of science is
determined primarily by human creative imagination and not by the universe of facts
which surround us" [Laudan, 1990: 55; footnote 6]. This, however, only indicates that
science progresses through creative imagination, not that there are no objective "facts"
at all. In fact, Lakatos may even have been supporting the notion of objective facts
actually existing. Whichever way, science cannot claim to be absolutely objective, or
there wouldn't be any disagreement, changeor progress in science at all.
It is possible, however, to claim that science is "quasi-objective" on many matters, and
there is much that it can teach us, as long as the human subjectivity of it is also
acknowledged, and recognising that it is not absolute.
Philosophical postmodernism (as a discipline) does not embody any single point of view
[Beck, 1993: par. 7]. There are many different types of postmodernism, and, as
indicated above, many different views on what postmodernism is. The postmodernism
endorsed by this author is one that liberates society from some of the constrictions of
modernism, whilst still retaining some form of stability and organisation (for the sake of
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civil peace); and that promotes acceptance, diversity and creativity whilst still
emphasising knowledgeand progress. It is a "wake up call" for every person living today,
to respect and accept all others, but not to give in to the pressure of conforming or the
self-satisfaction of complacency.
2.4 Conclusion:
So modernism was (is) a systematic and reasonable way of thinking [Degenaar, 1993: 53]:
a foundation of linear, temporal and progressive logic - governed by that all-human
faculty of Reason- that replaced traditional mystical thinking. Modernist science is
rational, empirical and technological, with a focus on uniform, purposeful and universal
progress [Gone, 1991: 92].
This is reflected in the functionality of modernist architecture. Man has become self-
aware, and what is seen as true knowledge is that which can be verified empirically, and
reasoned rationally. Modernism also affected society and culture, making it more
autonomous,democratic and also dehumanising. As people became 'things' they began to
rebel, and search for newways of creating individual meaning.
Postmodernism, therefore, initially arose out of a frustration towards the dehumanising
effect of modernism. A tradition of plurality and tolerance fosters a culture of
individual creativity, where otherness is celebrated, and cultural freedom is developed
[Degenaar, 1993: 53]. Relationships become all-important; be it one's relationship with
friends, family, the community, work, the system or society as a whole. Man recognises
and acknowledges the "complexity of things", and realises that reason is not "ali-
supreme" [Degenaar, 1993: 53].
A fragmented and subjective logic produces a science of hyperreality; a simulation
governed by synthetic, aesthetic, dynamic reason. Knowledge in a postmodern world is
not that which can be verified or studied; rather, it is whatever the simulator says it is.
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Much of what one regards as true one accepts merely because one read it in a magazine
or encyclopaedia, or saw it in the media. The simulator's simulation has become more
important than what really is true.
But what does "modern"actually mean? For consumers, and especially those who market
and sell to consumers, to be modern means merely to be new. It is "le dernier cri", or
the latest thing [Toulmin, 1990: 5; Eagleton, 2000: 83]. It could, therefore, be possible
that modernism never really died out, never really passed. Did postmodernism ever
actually rep/ace modernism? Modernism and postmodernism are connected. Modernism
can also be seen as complex, as changing with each discipline and context [Taylor, 1992:
12].
It could be that man is now in an era where modernism and postmodernism are both
present, and both influence the way society and the individual run their lives.
Is this then how it should be? Should society nowadays be built around a culture that
incorporates the best of the modern, postmodern and even pre-modern worlds, whilst
striving to eliminate the mistakes of these eras?
Perhaps.
But is this the way contemporary society is moving? It does not appear so. The liberty
and autonomy given to man (through modernism) to realise "human realities, goals and
desires" [Milbank, 1992: 30] was (ideally) intended to bring freedom, rationality and
progress. And the loosening of modernity's restrictive bonds was at least partially
supposedto breed creativity, independence and free thinking.
Unfortunately it seems that most people's idea of a postmodern world involves more
control, more freedom (for themselves) and more taking. Essentially, more ME. And if
each person is his or her own God, society is in for a titanic battle for ultimate control
of the world.
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There are many that believe that the postmodern condition is merely a collection of
many fragmented discourses where anything goes, for where the individual is central,
each could claim (the most) importance to their local discourse, and no one could
challenge or oppose the claim of the next.
It may be possible to see postmodernism as a free-for-all if one views the postmodern
individual as its most important component. But this is not entirely correct. It is not
the individual that is important, but the relationship. The relationship he/she has with
other individuals, the system, his/her work, environment, him-/herself. Focus on the
relationship and it is impossible for "anything to go", for relationship implies
consideration.
Also, in the postmodern society, one is always involved in some kind of network. One
discourse is always linked to manyothers, which are dynamic and interacting all the time.
Each individual is part of this network, part of many different patterns of thought and
action. Never isolated, never static. Always richer.
In the chapters to follow, how modernism and postmodernism relate to two major
phenomena - chaos and complexity - will be investigated. Whether or not these two
phenomena can be called modern or postmodern is an important feature of the
comparative nature of this thesis, hence the discussion of modernism and
postmodernism above.
Therefore, it now becomes necessary to take the next step on the road of intense and
exciting discovery. The world of chaos is the next stepping stone on our quest towards
knowledge and understanding.
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Cllaptt!r 3 : Cllaos
3.1 Introduction
Most people desire at least some form of order in their lives. If there is none, they
(often) create it [Back, 1997: 50]. Indeed, it would not be possible for a society to
exist - where people must coexist - if there were not at least some rules governing
behaviour.
A society can be seen as an example of an adaptive system. These systems can display
different types of behaviour, such as order, complexity and chaos. Chaos theory
examines the surprising behaviour some systems display when they reach certain points.
All of these (above) types of behaviour displayed by adaptive systems are important
when one considers the process of acquiring knowledge. Because knowledge is also a
type of dynamic system, one must understand the different behaviours dynamic systems
can produce, in order to understand how man acquires knowledge. One must be aware
that dynamic systems can display distinctly different behaviours.
At times, though, it becomes difficult to distinguish between certain behaviours or
distinctions, such as random and pattern, limits and delimits, inside or outside of
boundaries. It was (is) a predominant characteristic of modernism that strove to keep
these distinctions separate. But many people are becoming increasingly aware of the
fact that it is not always possible, nor desirable, to keep these' opposites' separate.
Sometimes, a phenomenon can be both of two different opposites, depending on the
perspective of the observer. For example, the detail of cloud formations may seem
random when viewed up close, but if one sees them from a distant position (such as the
ground), one can often perceive them as forming distinct patterns.
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The above distinction - random vs. pattern - can at times be reversed, or even
dissolved entirely. It is therefore not always necessary for these distinctions to be
mutually exclusive; sometimes they may exist together, simultaneously. Cloud patterns
can be both random and patterned, depending on one's viewpoint. It is important to
realise that many phenomena cannot simply be defined, categorised or labelled and then
put away in a 'box' of similar things. Many phenomena fit into multiple 'boxes' and
should not be regarded as merely an instance of 'this or that'.
Similarly, chaos cannot be put in a box, cannot be limited in that way. If one tries to
understand it in such a way, one will surely fail, for "where chaos begins, classical
science stops" [Gleick, 1987: 3].
There are many examples of systems with chaotic characteristics around us constantly:
the weather, the behaviour of cars on a highway, hurricane patterns on radar, the swirls
of a mountain stream, uncontrollable patterns of rising smoke, stresses that lead to war,
and so on [examples Gleick, 1987: 5; and Devaney, 1990: 151]. That is why an
understanding of chaos and how it works can be so important for so many different
fields of study.
It may one day be possible to predict future behaviour more accurately than is now
possible, by better understanding the behaviours of the systems involved. If
sociologists can understand why cars on a highway behave in a particular way, they may
be able to prevent accidents. And if the stresses that eventually lead to war can be
fully understood, (understanding) chaos may actually prevent wars in the future.
However, because of the nature of chaos and chaotic behaviour, it is important to
remember that it is not possible to predict the behaviour of a system displaying chaos
entirely. Chaos theory shows that it is only possible to predict this behaviour up until a
certain point, after which the number of possible states of behaviour become too great.
How is it possible that simple laws can explain complex behaviour? The phenomenon of
chaos sheds some light on this question. Chaos is also merely a framework, a way of
viewing the world we live in. In attempting to understand chaos, one can equip oneself
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better for the greater task of understanding knowledge itself. If chaos can provide one
with a workable background for understanding the nature of knowledge and what it
means to have it, then one is one step closer to finding out just what human knowledge
is.
The discussion begins with a look at the rise of chaos from a historical point of view-
it usually helps one's understanding of a new subject if one can see a timeline of its
development - and then progresses to introductory remarks about chaos: what it is and
what is necessary for its existence. After the basics are understood, one can move on
to the in-depth science pertaining to the phenomenonof chaos and its applications.
After studying the science and concepts of chaos, one can judge for oneself the
strength of this theory as a context for obtaining and understanding knowledge.
Whether or not one is more equipped to "understand" after studying chaos remains to
be seen.
But first, one must become acquainted with chaos.
3.2 History
Most of the investigation into the phenomenon of chaos has been fairly recent, although
scientists have been pavingthe way towards its discovery for a number of centuries.
When Newton and Leibniz developed calculus in the middle of the seventeenth century
[Guastello, 1995: 11],they unwittingly placed (mathematical) scientific investigation on a
path headed for chaos, for with the tools of calculus, mathematicians were able to
address most problems - until they came to prediction.
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They discovered that calculus (and with it conventional mathematics) helped for only
certain problems of prediction, and did not appear to work for others at all. Without
knowingit, they had come up to the borders of chaos.
In ancient Greek philosophy there was a theory (or a belief) that all events -
everything that happens - are effects of a chain of earlier events. Around 1500 this
came to science as the theory of determinism [Mendelson & Blumenthal, 2000: par. 2].
Cause and effect rules became one of the most important principles of science.
Sir Isaac Newton's laws were deterministic, and therefore able to predict quite
accurately the behaviour of (deterministic) systems. His laws were based on the belief
that everything that happened would be based wholly on what happened just before
[Mendelson & Blumenthal, 2000: par. 2].
Determinism was an important scientific theory, because it showed howevents could be
causally linked together. Every link (cause to effect) in the chain is solid [Honderich,
1995: 194], and every choice, result and action is the inevitable effect of earlier causes
[McLeod,1986: 232]. This means that all choices are already determined, and should be
able to be predicted.
So, if a system is deterministic, it means that if the initial conditions (values describing
the system at a certain time [Korsch & Jodi, 1994: 303]) of that system are known,then
its future states can be predicted with relatively high accuracy. In other words, if one
knows the precise conditions that were present at the beginning of some system's
behaviour, then future behaviour of that system can be calculated accurately [Schuster,
1995: 1;Mullin,1993: xi].
In the early nineteenth century, Laplace's belief that the movement of all physical
bodies could be expressed by equations [Guastello, 1995: 11] reintroduced determinism
as a strong scientific movement.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, French physicist and
mathematician, Jules Henri Poincaré, was working on a problem called the three-body
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problem of astrophysics: how to determine an object's path when it is influenced by
three gravitational forces (its own and that of two other objects or bodies in proximity)
[Murzi, 2001: par. 6]. These three objects form a system, because a change in anyone
of them affects the other two. The system is also deterministic, because the initial
positions and velocities (speeds) of the objects can be cclcukrted" [Murzi, 2001: par. 6].
Poincaré discovered that, in some instances, a minutely small change in the initial position
of one of the objects could lead to a hugely different later state than was predicted
(without the small change). He called this phenomenon chaotic determinism [Murzi,
2001: par 6].
A physicist by the name of Ludwig Boltzmann used the phrase "molecular chaos" as a
physical term over one hundred years ago [Bai-lin, 1997: 133]. This was most probably
the first time the word "chaos" was used to describe something non-regular, yet
ordered. By the turn of the twentieth century, physics was very close to discovering
chaos, because of scientists investigating problems such as the three-body problem of
astrophysics, turbulence, and solar system stability [Bai-lin, 1997: 133]; all of which
could not be satisfactorily explained by mere determinism alone.
In 1961, a meteorologist by the name of Edward Lorenz was working on the problem of
weather prediction. He had a computer that used three equations to model what the
weather (theoretically) might do [Chaos Theory, 2002: par. 2], and printed sequences of
numbers as output. One day, Lorenz wished to see a certain sequence again. He entered
the applicable number off the printout into the computer - 0.506 - and left for an
hour.
VVhenhe returned, he found that the sequence had diverged from the path of the
original [Chaos Theory, 2002: par. 3,4], growing more and more different, until after
some time, it was almost impossible to see the similarities between the new sequence
and the original.
3 And the law of gravity is constant. Both these conditionsmust be met for the system to be
deterministic.
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In the computer's memory, the numbers were stored to six decimal places, but to save
space, Lorenz only had the computer print the first three decimal places. The actual
number of the original sequence was 0.506127 [Chaos Theory, 2002: par. 4]. a mere one
hundred and twenty-seven millionths more than what Lorenz typed in for the new
sequence. He had expected the sequences to at least run very similarly - as most
scientists would have. Accuracy of three decimal places - thousandths of a unit - is
almost impossible to measure, and so surely the fourth, fifth and sixth decimal places
couldn't have more than a minusculeeffect on the result [Chaos Theory, 2002: par. 5].
What Lorenz discovered is one of the most important properties of chaos: very small
changes in the initial states of a system can have huge effects on its future states.
This came to be called the butterfly effect [Chaos Theory, 2002: par. 6]. Initial
differences such as Lorenz discovered are often so small that they can be compared
atmospherically to the flapping of a butterfly's wings [Chaos Theory, 2002: par. 6].
Givenenough time, this difference could actually change the atmosphere, and eventually
cause a huge atmospheric disruption - such as a tornado - that wouldn't ordinarily
have happened, elsewhere in the world [Ian Stewart, quoted in Chaos Theory, 2002: par.
7].
It is, of course, also possible that the energy of the butterfly's wings could dissipate
and have no effect on the atmosphere whatsoever (or some effect between nothing and
a tornado). This is a mark of chaos: it is not possible to know accurately what effect
could occur.
In scientific terms, this feature of chaos is known as sensitive dependence on initial
conditions [Cohen & Stewart, 1994: 191]. If one could know the initial state of a
phenomenon precisely, then one could predict its future state entirely [Campbell &
Mayer-Kress, 1997: 23]. Prediction implies that one can knowthe future with the same
certainty as knowingthe present [Saperstein, 1997: 103].
Prediction has been the problem facing many scientists in a wide range of fields, from
meteorology to medicine, ecology, engineering and even behavioural science, for many
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years. For a long time it was believed that if one could measure initial states with a
relative degree of accuracy, one would get relatively accurate results, i.e, one could
predict future states with relatively high accuracy.
This was believed becausescientists were working mainly with linear systems, where the
response to any change in a system is proportional to the size of that change [Korsch &
Jodi, 1994: 304). In other words, if one were, for example, following a simple recipe for
biscuits, and one doubled the amount of ingredients, then one would get double the
number of biscuits at the end (all other things constant).
This principle works fairly well for all linear systems, and even some (weak) non-linear
ones, and the results scientists achieved substantiated this belief. A small difference
between the starting conditions of two experiments caused only a minor difference in
their outcomes [Campbell & Mayer-Kress, 1997: 23]. and it was believed that these
initial differences were negligible.
By the 1970's there was much more scientific inquiry into instances of disorder and
irregularity worldwide than there had been previously. Look out of a window, and try to
find any straight line that is not man-made. Most naturally occurring structures are
inherently non-linear, yet most descriptions or representations of these things tend to
be with straight lines [Guastello, 1995: i).
This may be because linearity is much easier to deal with. But non-linearity gives a much
more accurate description of most phenomena [Guastello, 1995: 3]. and when scientists
discovered this, and began investigating non-linearity, they began to discover order
developing in many areas previously seen as merely randomly chaotic (i.e. no order
whatsoever, totally random): the human heart, gypsy moth populations, stock price data,
paths of lightening, clusters of stars, turbulence and many more [examples Gleick, 1987:
3-4].
They then began to investigate (stronger) non-linear systems - and the seemingly
random phenomena some of them produced - more closely, but it was some time still
before the world's scientists realised the implications of the butterfly effect. For
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prediction of more non-linear phenomenait meant that the initial states of such systems
would have to be taken into account, and would have to be knownwith infinite precision.
One would have to be infinitely certain of the initial conditions governing the system:
qnly then c;ould one expect a valid and accurate prediction. This is, however, not
possible, as no instrument can measure with infinite accuracy, no person can measure a
current state with an infinite degree of accuracy, and no mind can comprehend infinite
certainty.
Take the following example of mathematical chaos: n = 22/7 or 3.1415978... and apply
this working rule: "chop off everything before the decimal point and multiply by ten"
[Cohen& Stewart, 1994: 191-192]. This will illustrate the necessity for precision.
If one takes n to be 3.14159, after applying the rule five times, one will have: 1.4159,
then 4.159, 1.59, 5.9 and finally 9. If n is taken as 3.141597 (one more decimal place),
one would get: 1.41597, 4.1597, 1.597, 5.97, 9.7 and finally 7 (after six applications).
And if n is made one decimal longer, 3.1415978, then the following series is reached:
1.41~978, 4.15978, 1.5978,5.978,9.78, 7.8 and 8.
Each of the above instances differs by only one decimal place, but each gives a
completely different answer: 9, 7 and 8. This means that no matter how many decimals
one takes, one will eventually be able to come to a different answer. This tiny change in
the initial conditions of this mathematical system (n) means that one would have to
specify n up to infinite decimals, to be sure of getting an accurate answer.
This is why prediction (amongst other things) has been so limited in the past, end why
meteorologists' proficiency at weather prediction reaches only as f~r as a few days.
This is an important philosophical consideration of chaos [Ruelle, 1997: 99]: it means
that without infinite precision in initial conditions, (long-term) prediction evades our
grasp.
Edward Lorenz, in 1961, had discovered the principle of sensitive dependence on initial
conditions - the most important feature of chaos [Sakai, 2001: 2] - quite by accident,
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and in so doing, (perhaps unwittingly) opened the doors to the uncovering of the most
recent of the great scientific discoveries: the phenomenon of chaos.
3.3 What is Chaos?
When one hears the word "chaos", one usually thinks of the dictionary definition of
chaos, something indicating "complete disorder': "utter confusion" [McLeod, 19,86: 141;
Glass, 1997: 220; OED, 1989: par. 8 "chaos'1,or total randomness, because that is what
is conventionally understood by the word. This is, however, not what the science of
chaos refers to.
Chaos is not disordered, nor is it entirely random either. It is therefore not surprising
that there has been much confusion about the nature of chaos, and also why many
scientists are wary of using the word "chaos", preferring terms such as "non-linear
dynamical systems theory" (ND?) [Guastello, 1995: 3]; "non-periodic, deterministic flow"
[Kendall et. cl., 1997: 198]; or irregular, deterministic, complex phenomena [Mayer-
Kress, 1995: par. 1].
The term "chaos" was first used to describe phenomena that appeared to scientists to
be totally random, without order, i.e. chaotic. Only later, once technology had improved
sufficiently to allow non-linear systems tó be observed and analysed properly, did
scientists realise that what they had been calling "chaos" was in fact not chaotic at all;
rather, it was hi9hly complex behaviour that stuck to certain deterministic rules. But
because the movement of chaotic systems is "complicated and irregular" [Ruelle, 1997:
99], it is not surprising that scientists viewed it as strange, disordered, and ... chaotic.
So what is this complex phenomenon called chaos? Simply put, chaos is the "behaviour
of a system which is governed by deterministic laws but is so unpredictable as to appear
random, owing to its extreme sensitivity to changes in parameters" (initial conditions)
[OED, 1989: par. 19 (under heading chaos)].
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Chaos is the "science of the global nature of systems" [Gleick, 1987: 5]. A system can
be anything involving two or more elements that interact with one another, and having a
clearly defined boundary (governing what is inside or outside the system).
Take again, for example, the three-body problem of astrophysics: how to determine an
object's path when influenced by three gravitational forces (its own and that of two
other objects or bodies in proximity) [Murzi, 2001: par. 6]. These three bodies can be
seen to form a system, for they interact with one another - i.e. changes in one body
have effects in the others - and the system's boundary can be defined (meaning merely
that it is possible to knowwhat is inside this system, and what is outside it).
Chaosoccurs in dynamical systems. The elements of a dynamical system must not only
interact with one another, they must also be interdependent with one another [Stroup,
1997: 126-127]. This is because of the second important factor of dynamical systems.
They must be able to adapt to changes in the environment. A dynamical system has what
is known as the capacity to self-organise. If some kind of external stress from the
environment causes change in the system, the system has the capability to reorganise
itself and its elements so that it can adapt to the external change. This involves not
only returning to some sort of stable state, but also incorporating the effects of the
change so as to "learn" from them.
For chaos to occur, the system must display four key factors: sensitivity to initial
conditions, non-linearity, self-organisation and iteration. The first three of these have
already been discussed. If a system is sensitive to initial conditions, very small changes
in these initial conditions can increase exponentially, resulting in tremendous, drastically
disproportionate effects [Sakai, 2001: 2].
For a system to be non-linear, initial changesmust cause disproportionate results [Elliott
& Kiel, 1997: 66], often surfacing as discontinuous, sudden changes in the system's
behaviour [Gleick, 1987: 8]. This is of course included in the first factor, as a system
cannot be sensitive to initial conditions unless it is non-linear [Mullin, 1993: x; Kersch &
Jodi, 1994: 300].
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Non-linearity of a system implies non-periodicity [Gleick, 1987: 22: Glass, 1997: 220].
This just means that the behaviour of the system in not regular or recurrent [Mendelson
& Blumenthal, 2000: par. 5]. In other words, it does not repeat exactly the same
behaviour after a certain amount of time.
To illustrate what periodic means, take the above-mentioned working rule for
mathematical chaos and apply it to: 1.2121212... From the second application onwards,
the results oscillate between 1.21212... and 2.1212. This kind of oscillation means the
system is periodic [Cohen& Stewart, 1994: 192].
Any non-periodic system - such as weather, animal populations or epidemics [examples
Gleiek, 1987: 19-22] - can lead to unpredictability. For weather, for example, relatively
accurate prediction is only possible up to a few days. After that, the "uncertainties [of
the butterfly effect] multiply" [Gleiek, 1987: 20-21], and prediction becomes impossible.
Yet through the seeming randomness of weather, there runs a fine line of structure and
order. This is characteristic of chaotic systems, and is what makes them so difficult,
yet intriguing, to study. Systems that appear random, yet have a definite structure
rUeda, 1997: 325: Sakai, 2001: 2: Korsch & Jodi, 1994: 300: Mullin, 1993: x-xi], but still
remain constantly one step ahead of man's best attempts to understand and predict
them.
The capacity of a system to self.-organise and adapt to environmental changes is a very
important factor of a dynamical system: for a system to be able to learn from the
environment and adapt accordingly [Lee, 1997: 20] makes it a much more robust system,
and therefore this is the most difficult part of dynamical systems to understand and
recreate.
The fourth and final criterion for dynamical systems is iteration, or feedback. This is
when some part of the system (which could be called output) loops back to be used again
(as input) [Stroup, 1997: 126-127]. In other words, at some point, the system produces
some information that is then fed back and used at some other point in the system.
This is the same as what is known in mathematical terms as recursion. Certain future
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states of the dynamical system depend on earlier (or on earlier) state or states [Eve,
Horsfall & Lee, 1997: xxix].
Self-organisation of a dynamical system can also be defined as a "natural process
whereby feedback loops within a complex system give rise to non-linear behaviour"
[Guastello, 1995: 12]. And this non-linear behaviour is knownas chaos. It is therefore
often difficult to know precisely which dynamical systems will lead to chaos [Eve,
Horsfall & Lee, 1997: xxix].
3.4 The Science of Chaos
Now that the basics of chaos theory have been covered, it is time to progress to the
substance of the subject. This section is much more technical, and though it may be
complicated at times, a detailed knowledge of chaos theory is necessary for an
understanding of what this phenomenon chaos is and how it works. For to acquire
adequate knowledgeof a subject, one must study it in detail.
After Edward Lorenz discovered the principle of sensitive dependence on initial
conditions, he started lookingfor other non-linear systems that might display the same
sort of chaotic or deviatory behaviour [Chaos Theory, 2002: par. 10]. He decided to
investigate fluid turbulence, by stripping convection equations down until they were
unrealistically simple, and he discovered that convection could lead to chaotic behaviour
at high enough temperatures [Gleick, 1987: 25].
Convection
When fluid (for example, water) in a box with a smooth bottom is heated from below,
the hot water will attempt to move to the top (because heat rises), but the fluid's
viscosity will keep it at rest. The system is stable, at thermodynamic equilibrium; this
means to stay in the same steady state, and if some external disturbance forces 0
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change in the system, it will eventually return to that state of equilibrium [Gleick, 1987:
26].
If the heat is turned up, the fluid will expand as it becomes hotter, and therefore
become less dense, which willmake it lighter. When light enough to overcome viscosity,
the hot fluid will begin to rise. A convection roll (which resembles a cylinder) will start
to form: hot fluid rising on the one side and cooler fluid sinking on the other (see figure
3.1 (a». This is knownas the process of convection [Gleiek, 1987: 26]. There willmost
likely be more than one convection roll at a time in the box.
When the heat is turned up even more, the rolls start to wobble. As the hot fluid rises
along the roll, it comes into contact with the cooler fluid, and starts to lose heat. If the
roll is turning fast enough, the hot fluid will not have cooled down sufficiently when it
starts to move down the other side of the roll, and so it will start to push back up
against the hot fluid coming up behind it. This causes the instability that makes the
wobble in the convection roll (see 3.1 (b».
At even higher temperatures, this flow becomes chaotic (turbulent) [Gleiek, 1987: 26].
This simple example of fluid turbulence, through convection, became the most universal
example of chaos [Turcotte, 1997: 3].
Figure 3.1 (a): Convection roll Figure 3.1 (b~· Chaotic flow
Lorenz's stripped down equations did not exactly model real convection properly, they
were too simplistic, but there was a real-life system that the equations did model: the
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Lorenzian waterwheel [Gleick, 1987: 26,29]. This is a waterwheel with buckets that are
open at the top and have holes in the bottom.
WatetWheel
Water pours in at the top at an even rate. If the flow is slow, the top bucket never has
a chance to fill up because the water runs out too fast. If the top bucket does not fill
up, it will not become heavy enough to overcome friction, and the waterwheel will remain
stationary [Gleick, 1987: 27].
If the flow is faster, the top bucket will start to fill up, and its weight will cause the
wheel to start turning. As each bucket is filled, its weight will keep the wheel moving(in
the same direction), with full, heavy buckets movingdown the one side, getting emptier
and emptier, and lighter, emptying buckets movingup the other side. The waterwheel
will settle into this steady state (equilibrium) {see figure 3.2 (a» [Gleick, 1987: 27].
But if the flow is increased further, the non-linearity in the system starts to have an
effect. The buckets do not have enough time to fill up properly if the wheel is turning
too fast, so they are not heavy enough to keep the wheel' 5 momentum going. Buckets
can also start up the other side before they have emptied enough. Their weight then
willcause the waterwheel to stop turning, and change direction (see figure 3.2 (b».
Figure 3.2 (a); Loreraian waterwheel (equilibrium) Figure 3.2 (bj; Chaotic spin
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Lorenz discovered that, over long periods of time, the waterwheel would change
direction many times, not staying at 0 steady rote, but also not repeating itself
predictably [Gleick, 1987: 27].
It appeared to Lorenz that his stripped down equations hod led to completely random
behaviour, but when he plotted them on 0 graph, he noticed that it was not entirely
random. The motion of the waterwheel always stayed on the some double spiral, never
intersecting its own path, but also staying within certain limits. The behaviour of the
waterwheel was therefore definitely ordered, (not totally random), but it was 0 new kind
of order, not 0 steady state (of motion towards 0 single point), nor periodic
repetitiveness [ChaosTheory, 2002: par. 12;Gleick, 1987: 30-31].
Lorenz coiled this graphic representation (of the new kind of "orderedness") the
"Lorenz attractor" (see figure 3.8).
3.4.1 Attractors and Repellors
The behaviour of 0 system involvingchaos is greatly influenced by the attroctors and
repelfors that exist in its space. Anattractor, according to Korsch and Jodi (1994), is "0
geometric object in phase space towards which [0 system's] trajectories converge" -
given enough time [Kersch & Jodi, 1994: 299].
There ore four main types of attractors; however, only the first three (which concern
discrete systems) will be discussed here. The fourth type of attractor concerns
continuous systems, is quasi-periodic and leads to what is knownos 0 toroidal attractor.
3.4.1.1 Flxed-polnt attractor:
When 0 system's behaviour or motion tends towards 0 steady state or constant
value [Guastello, 1995: 13], that value is knownas 0 fixed-point ottractor. This
con be either 0 radial type (which attracts 011 trajectories towards the centre),
or 0 spiral type (where the system's trajectories spiral inwards towards the
fixed point) [Guastelfo, 1995: 13; Gleick, 1987].
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If, for example, one held a rubber tube such as the inner tube of a bicycle
motionless with a ball bearing on the inside, the ball bearing wouldbe at rest at
the lowest part of the tube. Should one move the tube, however, the ball
bearing will always eventually come back to rest at that lowest point of the
tube (see figure 3.3). On paper, all the ball bearing's trajectories would tend
towards that lowest point - an attracting fixed point of the radial type (see
figure 3.4).
r················\., /······_········7
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Figure 3.3: Motion of 0 boll bearing in on inner tube [example Mul/in, 1993: xi-xii}
Figure 3.4: A fixed-point radiolottractor
Another example of a fixed-point attractor is the motion of a pendulum
[Gleick, 1987]. A pendulum appears to repeat the same motion over and over
again: one side to another, and then back again. But although this motion
appears periodic, the pendulum does not follow exactly the same path each
time. Because of friction, its speed will be a little less each time, and the
distance it travels willalso be a bit less each time.
If one plots the motion of the pendulum (as it swings back and forth) on a
graph, each point representing the pendulum's distance travelled and velocity
(speed) at a particular time; as it starts to move (position A, see figure 3.5), its
velocity is zero, and its position is maximumdistance (to the left of the rest
position, where the distance is zero).
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At position B, the distance is zero (rest), and the pendulum's velocity is nowat
a maximum (because gravity has pulled the pendulum ball down as far as
possible). The pendulum's momentum then keeps it going up (against gravity)
until position C,where its distance is again maximum(to the right of rest), and
it slows down to a velocity of zero (gravity is winning). Here it turns around
and moves back through position Bto position A.
The pendulum's motion from C to A will only mirror that of its motion from A
to C if there is no friction at all. In a real case, friction causes the pendulum
to lose a bit of velocity and distance at each section of its motion, and so the
trajectory is a spiral (not a circle), where all motion tends towards the stable
state of nomotion at all- a spiral type fixed-point attractor (see figure 3.6).
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FigllCe3.5: Motion of a pendulum [example Gleiek, 1987J
Figure 3.6: A fixed-point spiral attractor
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Fixed point attractors are very predictable, and are hardly ever found in human
systems [Fitzgerald & Eijnatten, 2002: 412].
3.4.1.2 Umlt-cvcJeattractor:
The second type of attractor is knownas a limit cycle. This is an attractor
that keeps an object in orbit around its centre [Guastello, 1995: 14]. To return
to the ball bearing and tube example; if one were to place the tube (with the
ball bearing inside) in the centre of a level turntable that is turning at a
constant spud, the ball bearing inside the tube would follow a fixed route
around the middle of the turntable. If one were to draw this route on paper, it
would resemble an ellipse around the centre-point of the turntable (see figure
3.7). This (route) is knownas a limit cycle.
Figur~3.7: A limit cycl~ attractor {exomp/~Mullin,1993: x-xi}
3.4.1.3 Strange or chaotic 8ttractor:
The third kind of attractor is called a strange or chaotic attractor. This is ua
complex geometric object in phase space towards which chaotic trajectories
move" after sufficient time [Korsch & Jodi, 1994: 306]. These trajectories
never repeat themselves, but are definitely ordered, and do stay within certain
limits [Guastello, 1995: 16-17; Mullin, 1993: xii]. Strange attractors are highly
unpredictable [Fitzgerald & Eijnatten, 2002: 412], can be generated by simple,
deterministic equations, and display the butterfly effect.
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The term "strange attractor" was first used by Ruelle and Takens around 1971
during their work on turbulence. There are many different kinds of strange
attractors, (see figures 3.9, 3.10 & 3.11); the above-mentioned Lorenz
attractor is just one of them. The Lorenz attractor displays infinite
complexity, and the two different wings represent different directions of spin
(crossover from one side to the other; see figure 3.8) [Gleick, 1987: 31].
Figure 3,8: The Lorenz attroctor
Figure 3.9: The Japanese (Veda) artroetor
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Figure 3.10: The Henon ottroctor
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Figure 3.11: The Rossler ottroctor
The opposite of an attractor is called a repellor, and its range of influence is knownas a
separatrix. An attractor's range of influence is called a basin [Guastello, 1995: 13, 15].
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It is possible for dynamical systems to have both attractor and repellors points, and
some points can have both attractor and repellors properties, such as saddle points (see
figure 3.12).
Figure 3.12: Saddle point
Systems can be classified as stable or unstable. Systems that are stable are unlikely to
change. Stable means that they have low entropy, or the rate at which information
about a variable (of the system)'s predictability is lost, is low[Guastello,1995: 22,56].
Examples of stable systems include fixed-point attractors, limit cycles and chaotic
attractors (as a whole). Unstable systems lead to change, which often causes
unpredictable or non-repeatable results [Guastello, 1995: 22; Korsch & Jodi, 1994: 303].
Unstable systems (such as repellors, saddles and chaotic attractors (on a local level»
have high entropy. This means that it becomes increasingly difficult to predict what any
one element of the system might do, and therefore more and more difficult to know
what the system as a whole might do.
3.4.2 Bifurcation
In dynamical systems, the same kind of behaviour does not need to be present at all
times - the elements of a system can display different behaviour at different times -
especially if the system is unstable. If a system is unstable, it can reach what is known
as a bifurcation point: a critical point beyond which "bifurcation" takes place.
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Bifurcation is when a system Is elements follow a common path (up to the bifurcation
point), but then diverge into two or more directions [Guastello, 1995: 25, 26].
Bifurcation points are qualitatiw changes in dynamical behaviour. There are four types
of bifurcation.
3.4.2.1 Subtle:
Subtle bifurcation is where one type of attractor or repellor turns into
another. For example, a weak limit cycle can turn into a spiral repellor when
agitated, or a point attractor can become a repellor4 [Guastello, 1995: 25].
Another way in which subtle bifurcation can take place is when the system has
regions or areas (called terrains) in phase-space occupied by both attractor
basins and repellor separatrices, such as in catastrophe theory. This theory
investigates those extraordinary areas in a dynamical system that lead to
discontinuity and abrupt changes. Catastrophe theory is a model for the
conditions under which these abrupt changes take place [Back, 1997: 48].
3.4.2.2 Period doubling:
The second type of bifurcation is where a limit cycle suddenly changes into a
cycle of twice the period [Korsch & Jodi, 1994: 304]. A period is "the time
taken to complete one cycle of a regularly recurring phenomenon" [Mcleod,
1986: 627]; i.e. periodically. Beyond the critical point, where this occurs, the
motion becomes chaotic.
3.4.2.3 catastrOPhic:
The third type of bifurcation is called catastrophic bifurcation. This occurs
when terrains that haw different kinds of attractors and repellors (or
combinations thereof) suddenly change dramatically. For example, in a terrain
that contains a repellor and a saddle, a limit cycle can suddenly appear "out of
the blue". This is knownas a "blue sky catastroph~" [Guastello, 1995: 46-47].
4 This is known as the "Hopf bifurcationN•
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3.4.2.4 ExPlosIve:
The last bifurcation type is knownas explosive bifurcation. Terrains containing
multiple attractors or repellors (or combinations thereof) change because of a
variable in the system that is altered, and cause collisions that lead to
explosive changes in the terrain.
A collision between a limit cycle and a repellor creates a point attractor; this is
knownas the lIannihilation dynamic". Collisionbetween attractors in a terrain
with a saddle, repellor and fixed-point attractor causes the saddle and the
fixed-point attractor to disappear, and a limit cycle to form around the
repellor - this is called the "blue /oop annihilotion" [Guastello, 1995: 46-47].
It is also possible for a system to change from one sort of behaviour to another. A
system can go from periodic behaviour to chaos without going through increased
bifurcation and period doubling [Guastella, 1995: 28]. Therefore, a dynamical system
displaying chaos does not need to be restricted to one type of bifurcation, just as it
need not be limited to one kind of attractor or repellor either.
3.4.3 Fmetals
Dynamical systems demonstrating chaos will at some point display the characteristics
that cause fractal structures. These structures are mathematical constructs caused by
self-similarity.
As a physicist and mathematician, Poincaré at some time studied the distribution of
stable and unstable points in phase-space. This distribution is so chaotic that he did not
try to graph it. Itwas only when Benoit Mandelbrot, Cl mathematician working for IBM,
began studying the phenomenon of self-similarity a century later that Poincaré's
insights were developed [Murzi, 2001: par. 7]. Self-similarity is displayed when a system
has within itself an exact replica of itself - magnify a part of it to a certain scale, and
what is magnified is an exact replica of the whole [Korsch & Jodi, 1994: 305; Chaos
Theory, 2002: par. 20, 29]. Mandelbrot discovered chaos in the fluctuation of cotton
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prices, and his Mandelbrot set5 is probably the most famous of chaos images (see figure
3.13).
...
Figure 3.13: Mandelbrot set
A mathematician, Helge von Koch, used self-similarity to capture the problem of
determining the length of a coastline. No matter how much one magnifies a coastline,
one willalways miss those boys that would be visible if one magnified it more. VonKoch
used a structure knownas the Kochcurve to represent the coastline: in the middle of a
straight line an equilateral triangle is placed (first iteration: see figure 3.14 (a», and
then to each side another such triangle is added (second iteration; see figure 3.14 (b».
This is repeated over and over, and the resulting structure is a Koch curve (see figure
3.14 (c and d». This structure represented an image of a coastline, and magnification of
any part of the curve looked precisely like the whole - the Koch curve is therefore
self-similar [Chaos Theory, 2002: 23-24]. Also, curves like the Koch curve have infinite
perimeters, yet still have finite areas.
A;\
I \
I .\
. l ..\.-_-----------
Figure 3.14 raJ: The Koch curve (first iteration)
5Mandelbrot set: self-similor chaotic behaviour' from a very simple equation (Z=ZI+C).
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Figure 3.14 (b): The Kochcurve (second iteration)
Figure 3.14 (c): The Kochcurve (third iteration)
Figure 3.14 (dl: The Kochcurve (fourth iteration)
The Koch curve is also a fractal, an object that has fractional dimensionality (a
dimension that is a non-integer, i.e. a fraction) [Korsch & Jodi, 1994: 302; Guastello,
1995: 29]. The Koch curve is not smooth like a line or a curve, which haw dimensions of
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1, but it does not really have an area like a square either, which has a dimension of 2, so
the dimension of the Koch curve is between the 1wo; 1.26 in this case [Guastello, 1995:
25].
The Mandelbrot set is also fractal; so is the Lorenz attractor. Because of the infinitely
repeating self-similarity of strange attractors, they have been called "complex
mathematical figure[s] containing infinitely repeating detail in both ... fine and gross
structure" (see for example the Julia set, figure 3.15) [Eve, Horsfall & Lee, 1997: xxx].
Poincaré's distribution of stable and unstable points was also fractal, which is why he
could not graph it at the time. It was too complex. With modern computers, it has
become much easier to study fractals, and an understanding of how fractals function is
critical to the pursuit of knowledgeabout chaos.
Figure 3.15: The Julia set
Fractals are everywhere. One can see them in the ocean currents; in the flow of blood
through blood vessels; in tree branch structures ... the list is endless. Chaos has
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"inescapably become part of modern science" [Chaos Theory, 2002: par. 36]. Although
these fractal structures have been present for many years, man has only just begun to
learn how to see and understand them.
A scientist by the name of Feigenbaum discovered the scaling factor for the
bifurcations in the equation for population growth. The bifurcations occurred at a
constant scaling of 4.669 [Chaos Theory, 2002: par. 27]. This meant that the scale at
which the equation was self-similar was 4.669. So, if one magnified the diagramme of
the population growth equation 4.669 times, one would find an exact replica of the whole
diagramme.
Feigenbaum also discovered that other chaotic equations all displayed self-similarity at
exactly the same scaling rate - 4.669. This was a very important discovery. It meant
that something about chaotic equations was universal, something about chaos could be
fully analysed and understood because it was followinga simple, mathematical rule. The
first steps towards really understanding what chaos is and how it works were being
made. Chaos is not only not randomness, it also obeys mathematical rules.
Conversely, certain simple mathematical rules can cause highly complex or chaotic
behaviour. One of the most common examples of this is called the logistic functiorf.
This function appears simple and even linear, but when solved electronically, it can result
in chaotic behaviour after a certain number of iterations.
Fractal structures are not only found hiding in mathematical equations. They can be
seen everywhere. The structure of the veins on a fern (see figure 3.16), stock market
data graphs, the beat of the human heart, and even the intricate structure of the brain
are all fractals [examples Chaos Theory, 2002: par. 30, 32]. They are all self-similar,
and they all display chaotic patterns.
Chaotic systems also often display what is knownas emergence. This is what surfaces
out of the system once chaos has entered, though often ónly after bifurcation. A
6 The logistic function: Xt+J=kXt-kX/ (see Mor~til, 2002: 159-162 for discussion).
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"complex adaptive system ... give[s] rise dynamically to emergent phenomena..." [Smith,
1997: 55].
Figure 3.16: Fern fractal
Many examples of emergence een be seen every day. C4rtain chemicals appear in
different colours at different times. Sulphur, for example, may be yellow, orange, red
or purple. depending on how the atoms interact with the light. The wavelengths of the
light determine the colour, so the colour is not inherent in the chemical's atoms. but
emergent [Cohen& Stewart, 1994: 2321.
Also, out of the complex deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) system, through the right
chemistry, emerges life. Stuart Kauffman describes this emergence aptly:
Life... is an emergent phenomenon arising as the molecular diversity of a
prebiotic chemical system increases beyond a threshold of complexity {ed~ of
chao;;)... [L}ife is not located in the property of any single molecule... but in the
collective emergent properties of the whole they create: {T)he collectiV8
system does possess a stunning property not possessed by any of its parts. It is
able to reproduce itself and evolve... [it} is alive [Kauffman, 1995: 24].
7 Edge of chaos: see section 3.5.
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These emergent phenomena are not, however, merely the sum of the parts or processes
of the system [Smith, 1997: 55]. If one takes a look at the phenomenonof chaos as a
whole, one can see that simplicity emerges from chaos when order is brought to a
seemingly random system [Cohen & Stewart, 1994: 232]. Chaos plus order does not
equal simplicity, hence Henry Adams' statement: "chaos often breeds life, when order
breeds habit" [Mendelson & Blumenthal, 2000: par. 3]. Emergent phenomena are entirely
new phenomena on their own. This is knownas collapsing chaos [Cohen& Stewart, 1994:
232].
3.5 Chaos and Modernism
When Feigenbaum discovered the self-similar rate of chaotic equations (4.669), he
inadvertently proved that chaos could be seen as a modernist phenomenon, at least in
one particular way.
Chaos theory is lIa symbolic representation of the world... a dynamic [theory] that
captures movement and change" [Eve, Horsfall & Lee, 1997: xxxi]. Chaos is scientific,
deterministic and mathematical. It follows universal rules, and can be rationally
analysed using reasonable application of mathematical lows. Once these laws are
understood, chaos can lead to significant progress in many different fields [Lee, 1997:
16].
Because of the deterministic nature of chaos, it also has strong statistical regularities,
such as average. standard deviation and correlation [Kendall et. al. 1997: 198; Cohen &
Stewart. 1994: 233]. This can also be seen as a modernist feature, for with regularity
comes prediction. and with prediction. control. For modernists. the determining of facts
(Science) must take place objectively, so that regularities observed can lead to the
formulation of laws that can function as universal standards. To goin knowledge of this
world requires some sort of certainty, be it Descartes' observation that he definitively
exists, or the regularities born from chaotic systems followingdeterministic rules.
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For the modernist, reason and logic lead to (certain) knowledge. For the chaotic
theorist, knowledge is gleaned from an understanding of how the simple can give birth to
the complex, and how "random" activity can cause dynamic order. Once one understands
this about chaotic systems - something that was not possible until recent technological
developments - one can learn something about the nature of these systems, and about
the phenomena they affect.
Modernism is also concerned with order. Order that is rational, universal and controlled
by whomever supposedly has the knowledge and authority to do so. It is therefore very
important for modernist political figures to have the knowledge to create a social order
that can be run on functional, egalitarian principles (for what is equality other than
universal rights)?
Being too focused on progressive, liberal mastery of one's world, though, may cause one
to miss the individual, the different, the purposeful that may be present and may
contribute in a valuable way to the process of knowledgeaccumulation. It may also cause
one to alienate or even discriminate against the "other", who is just as important and
just as useful as the one who fits into the "box of reasonable existence".
Modernists revel in the autonomy and stability of the self. The self becomes the agent
of increasing knowledge, and therefore the instrument for the will to power. By
increasing one's knowledge one can increase one's power over those who do not have
that knowledge.
In chaos theory it is not the self that becomes the instrument of power, but the
system. Understanding how a system is able to evolve, adapt and self-organise, and how
it can creatively produce behaviour not inherent in its individual elements, is vital for
gainingpower. For if one has this understanding, one has knowledge that can be used to,
for example, give a dynamic business a competitive edge over other businesses.
There are many such applications for chaos and chaos theory. In 1991 Peters applied
chaos to his non-linear market dynamics theory. In the time series analysis of "specific
commodities and broader market indices" there are limit cycles and chaotic attractors
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[Guastello, 1995: 2961. Chaos occurs because of those events thQt were unexpected,
Qndeffect the 'normQl' price (distribution) curve. A mQrket crash is not chaos; it is
merely Qdrop from one basin to the next [Guastello, 1995: 296-297]. Peters observed
that chaos could cause creativity: if Qsystem (such QSQcompany or organisQtion) could
respond Qnd adQpt to the sudden Qnd unusual chQnges that chaos eeuses in its
environment, then it is being creative, Qndchaos hQSessentiQlly led to creativity.
With ehees. dualism becomes unimportQnt. Something does not necessarily need to be
en instenee of this or thQt; it CQnbe either, it can be both, it can be neither, or Qrange
of other things [Turner, 1997: xxiv]. In this way chaos theory departs from modernism,
for modernism upholds polQropposites such QSouter vs. inner (for exemple what is inside
or outside Qsystem's boundQries), subject vs. object, feet vs. value, science vs. religion,
theory vs. practice.
Systems can else be Qt the edge of chQOS(see section 4.3.1.4). These systems ere
mostly living systems that move in Qndout of chaos through self-organisQtion [Guastello,
1995: 521. For exQmple, consider contemporary evolution theory: natural selection
within highly diverse populations. The numbers (of the populQtions) or the distributions
of the genes border on chaos [Guastello, 1995: 521. The genetic structure of the
population is self-organised. This ensures the stability of the populQtion. If the
populQtions are stable, they become unsreble when disrupted by the environment. The
non-linear, self-organising nature of the system, however, ensures thQt it CQnlearn from
the disruption, QdQPt itself for future prediction, Qnd reorganise into Q new kind of
stQbility. Thus mQkingit highly dynamic.
3.6 Conclusion
So, chaos is not Q new phenomenon, it is merely Q new discovery. Chaos does not mean
random, disordered, disorganised; i.e. chaotic, in the traditional sense of the word.
RQther, chQOSimplies order, determinism, even regulQrity. Chaos, as has been shown, is
n
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not truly entirely random: self-similarity provides chaotic systems (systems displaying
deterministic chaos) with a certain inherent order to their structure. Because these
systems follow deterministic, universal, mathematical rules, they are scientific, ordered
and, essentially, modernistic.
What can an understanding of chaos as a phenomenon and a science tell one about
knowledge in itself? Knowledgeof phenomena specifically, and the universe in general,
can be greatly improved by an accurate understanding of chaos. Especially nowthat man
has been given a greater access to the intricacies of nature, through chaos, and to the
extraordinary self-organisation of fractals. One can learn much from studying these
natural phenomena. If the self-organisation and adaptation of such dynamical, natural
systems can be understood, then it can be applied in many different ways to everyday
life.
Chaos, and an understanding of its nature, has become one of the phenomena that link
manydisciplines and areas of investigation. As James Gleick says:
Choos breaks across the lines that separate scientific disciplines. Because it is a
science of the global nature of systems, it has brought together thinkers from
fields that had been widely seporotifd(Gleick, 1987: 5].
It may seem that chaos is quite removed from much of life and society, other than
physics (specifically) and science in general. But because of this broad spectrum of
influence, chaos is actually much more powerful and can be a much greater tool than was
originally envisaged. If, for example, a system (such as a company or organisation) is
aware of the critical (bifurcation) points that arise in its development, and it can
respond and adapt to the sudden and unusual change that causes chaos, then it can be
called creative, and chaos has caused creativity. It is then also less likely to succumb to
failure caused by unexpected change.
Unfortunately, this sounds much simpler than it actually is. Nearly all the tools of chaos
and complexity fail to offer much insight into real systems. This could be because (even
small) differences between reality and the model created by the tool get magnified and
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can grow into huge differences, so that the model in the end fails to represent reality at
all.
This said, understanding the complex science of non-linear systems can provide much
needed knowledge, facilitate dynamic prediction and ultimately, foster success in a
similar, everyday, human system. It is therefore vital that scientists continue the
endeavour to do just this.
Chaos and modernism are similar frameworks for seeking knowledge in many ways, but
they are not identical. One important difference is that modernism upholds dualisms, as
the distinction between two opposing elements is important for creating or
distinguishing universal phenolMna. In chaos theory, however, dualisms are not
important; boundaries are less rigid if not unnecessary. It is not possible to fully
understand a dynamic system if one does not understand at least sOlMthing of the
environment that system functions in. The line between inside and outside the system
becomes fuzzy, the internal and external fused.
A modernist approach to understanding is one that is based on reason and logic. These
scientific faculties are the keys to unlocking the secrets of knowledge. Discovering the
universal regularities that exist in nature leads to progress, and progress leads to a
more functional and ordered society. Only life that is well organised, efficient,
disciplined and in its rightful place has the right to be present in a modernist world, and
only such life will be successful.
Modernism can also be seen as a somewhat restrictive framework for knowledge. If only
what is scientific, empirical and objective can be called true knowledge, then it becomes
almost impossible to ever obtain such knowledge. Most observation is tainted by the
observer, most theories tainted at least in some way by the purporter. It is not possible
for man to be completely objective, for he can never escape his background or his
experiences.
Chaos theory may be seen as less restrictive when it comes to its use for acquiring
knowledge. Although chaotic systems still adhere to universal, mathematical taws, there
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is much freedom in what these systems can accomplish. The behaviour of deterministic
systems can be predicted, but with chaotic systems this prediction is only up until the
next critical point. One cannot knowwhen or where this point will occur, nor can one
predict the path the system's behaviour will followwhen chaos does set in, but one can
predict that it willoccur.
The occurrence of emergence - a wholly non-linear phenomenon - also implies slightly
more creative possibilities than one finds with purely deterministic (modernist) systems.
It is not possible to understand or explain the behaviour of a dynamic non-linear system
by studying or analysing its individual components. There is something new that emerges
out of the interaction of these elements - new in the sense that it was not contained in
the system's individual elements - something that can lead to new knowledge and
understanding.
There is much work left to be done in the field of chaos study [Chaos Theory, 2002, par.
36], but a keen interest in its possible applications, and a humble respect for its
greatness, should ensure that man takes great care to learn as much from chaos as is
humanlypossible.
AS a framework for knowledge acquisition, chaos has its advantages and its
disadvantages. But it remains somewhat limited in that the rules that govern its
behaviour do not change, and the system is 'condemned' to follow these rules, whether
they are in its best interest or not. For a somewhat less rigid knowledge framework, let
us consider complexity.
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CAIIp.' 4 :COlllpkxity
4.1 Introduction
Most systems around us are complex. One can see complexity in so many different
systems: societal structures, social behaviour, mental illness, education, climate, a human
cell, the evolution process, certain molecules such as sugar, a vortex, culture ... etc. The
list is endless. These systems surround people every day, and yet are often
misunderstood.
Complexity theory, like chaos theory, can be seen as a framework out of which one
interprets information, and acquires knowledge. Because it is one of the non·linear
sciences, it is able to afford one insight into the workings of non-linear systems, on a
much deeper level than linear methods can. And because so many everyday systems are
non-linear, it is vital that one first understands non-linearity and how systems display it.
The desire to understand the nature of our knowledge is crucial for an investigation into
the phenomenon of complexity [Cilliers, 2000: 32], and a sound understanding of
complexity may help one to fathom the depths of the nature of knowledge. Complexity
theory helps one understand non·linearity, and provides one with some perception of how
it is possible that systems can give rise to entirely new phenomena or behaviour that
hove little to do with the elements in the system individually.
This chapter discusses what complexity is, how and why it arose, and what one can learn
from it. Firstly, the history of complexity theory and complex systems is reviewed. It
is necessary to know how and why a phenomenon such as this came about, in order to
understand the impact it can have.
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Complex systems are then examined; first defining the terms, characteristics, and
states involved; then investigating how these systems deal with change and influence
society.
Hereafter, some 'types of complexity are considered, and then complexity theory is
considered as an example of a postmodernist theory. The similarities and differences
between complexity and postmodernism are highlighted, and then complexity theory's
contribution to the quest for the nature of knowledgeand truth is considered.
As a theory for understanding dynamic and evolving systems, complexity theory does
much to enlighten one's comprehension and appreciation of the complexity that
surrounds people every day. But one can only evaluate it as a framework for knowledge
once one knows just what complexity theory and complex systems are about. That is
what willbe discussed below.
4.2 History
The development of the complex sciences and complexity theory has been relatively
recent; however, pioneering scientists have been working on the ideas that led to this
development since a surprisingly early time.
A philosopher by the name of Lewes wos already working on a phenomenon he termed
'emergence' in the nineteenth century [Morrison, 2002: 6]., and in 1926 Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle, plus his work with Schr6dinger and Dirac, led to the discovery that
"some phenomena are probabilistic" [Rihani,2002: 6].
During the 1930's, Souter, a New Zealand economist, and Hodgson, his English
counterpart, were both working on 'emergence' and 'unpredictability'. At around the
same time, a biologist by the name of VonBertalanffy was tackling the problem of 'open
systems' [Morrison, 2002: 6]. In the 1940's he developed what came to be called
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~neral Systems Theory: a group of ideas that could be used in many different fields
[Flood & Carson, 1988: 2].
This theory eventually became a metadiscipline; it was interdisciplinary, not
multidisciplinary [Flood & Carson, 1988: 16]. By using the ideas of the ~neral Systems
Theory in an integrated way, physicists studying mechanics and astronomy, and biologists
studying zoology and botany, were able to work together in a new direction that became
known as biophysics. Similarly, sociologists, who studied cultures and institutions, and
psychologists, who studied groups and individuals, together paved the way towards what
is now called social psychology [Flood & Carson, 1988: 6].
Throughout the 1950's and '60's, many different scientists were working on the
problems of emergence, unpredictability cmd open systems, such as Allport, Polyani and
Katz and Kahn [Morrison. 2002: 6, 7], whilst towards the latter stages of the previous
century, more and more scientists from many different disciplines focused their
attention on the lesser-known problems of non-linearity and systems theory.
During the era when modernist approaches were most prevalent, most scientists dealt
with the issue of complexity from an analytical point of view. The complex was broken
down into simple parts, which were then each analysed individually. This is known as
reductionism8, and is also what was propounded by Descartes in his Rules for the
Direction of the Mind(see section 2.1.2).
The reductionist claims that the II... universe can be reduced to an understanding of its
smaller perts" [Mihata, 1997: 34]. The whole is equal to the sum of the parts;
therefore, one can understand something in its totality by studying its individual parts
[Rihani, 2002: 66].
There are two major problems with this view; however, both of which only became a
problem for scientists when they started working with more non-linear phenomena (see
sections 3.1 and 3.2). The first of these problems is that reductionism cannot account
for the times when the individual parts of a whole, through their interaction, result in
8 For a more detailed discussion and critique of this method. see Cilliers. 1993: 4: Urry. 2003: 13.
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something entirely new, something that could not be predicted through an analysis of
the individual parts [Cilliers, 1993: 4-5]. This phenomenon is knownas emergence (see
section 4.2.1 (ix».
The second difficulty with the reductionist approach to compl~ity is that it implies
that all sciences can eventually be reduced to physics (for this is where "smaller parts"
are studied), making the human and social sciences redundant [Mihata, 1997: 34]. But
fortunately scientists have become increasingly oware of the importance of these "non-
scientific" sciences, and what an understanding of the phenomena they cover could imply.
Studying the social sciences is vital for an understanding of social behaviour.
Understanding the factors that affect social interaction - such as social expectations,
lows, raw materials, technology, fiscal policies, competition etc. [Marion, 1999: 64] - can
help one appreciate why social beings act in certain ways. This could lead to a greater
understanding of phenomena such as crime (through sociologyand politics), mental illness
(psychology) and disease (biology/ medicine)[examples: Cilliers, 1993: 21].
4.3 Complexity and Complex Systems
There have been many so-called sub-sciences that have influenced the rise of the
thinking that led to complexity theory. These include gestalt psychology, field theory,
sociometry, information theory, game theory, fuzzy sets, catastrophe theory and chaos
[Back, 1997: 39]. Although it is not always certain which of complexity theory or chaos
theory developed first.
One can classify the non-linear sciences in terms of one goal: an interdisciplinary study
of systems that produce disproportionate and unexpected change [Elliott cSt Kiel, 1997:
66]. Or, as Kellyand Allisonassert: that "set of interdisciplinary studies that share the
idea that all things tend to self-organise into systems" [Kelly cSt Allison, 1998: 5]. This is
a relatively descriptive definition, as it includes the notion of 'self-organisation' (see
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section 4.2.2 (v», but it is rather general as it claims that all things must tend towards
this kind of behaviour.
Therefore, a slightly looser, working definition of the complex sciences is needed. This
could be something such as: the complex sciences are a set of interdisciplinary sciences
that study the behaviour of complex systems and their implications, which includes
mathematics, physics, biology, chemistry, chaos theory, cybernetics, synergetics and
non-linear dynamics [Kelly& Allison,1998: 5].
It is also important to note that the concepts "simple", "complicated" and "complex" are
rather more intricate than they seem. This is part of what makes complexity science
difficult to define. Something may appear complex, or complicated, yet actually be
simple, or vice versa. A snowflake appears very simple, but on closer inspection, it is
seen to have a very complicated structure. On the other hand, a combustion engine
appears extremely complex, but is actually a relatively simple mechanism [examples:
Cilliers, 1993: 6].
4.3.1 Characteristics of Complex Systems
The theory of complexity purported by each of the complex disciplines may differ in
some ways, but all have certain features in common. Firstly, "complexity... seeks to
establish pattern similarity" [Urry, 2003: 121] in many different complex systems. A
system includes two or more interacting elements (i.e. changes in one have an effect on
the others) [Jervis, 1997: 6], and having defined boundaries (governing what is inside or
outside the system) (see section 3.2).
4.3.l..1 Intel'actlon:
A complex system involves a high number of interacting components. The
behaviour of a complex system is defined by the "rich interaction" of the
individual components or elements of the system [Rihani, 2002: 7; Urry, 2003:
80; Mihata, 1997: 31; Cilliers, 1993: 7; 2000: 24]. This means that each
element interacts with many others - some directly and some indirectly
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through the path of others - and is why some (such as Gell-Mann) have
defined complexity as II ••• a function of the number of interactions between
elements in a systemll [Elliott & Kiel,1997: 66].
4.3.3..2 Dynamic:
Such a system must also be dynamic (see section 3.2). Dynamicmeans that it
changes over time: therefore, a dynamical system is "... a set of highly
interdependent variables evolvingover time" [Stroup, 1997: 126: Jervis, 1997:
17]. To evolve, a complex system must firstly survive, then learn from change
and its environment, and lastly adapt to these changes [Rihani, 2002: 8, 83:
Cilliers, 2000: 24].
4.3.1.3 Non-llnear;
The interaction between the individual elements of these kinds of systems
gives rise to behaviour that cannot be mapped linearly [Smith, 1997: 55:
Cilliers, 1993: 8]. This means that linearity does not explain the behaviour
correctly or sufficiently. Because the elements in a dynamical system can
evolve, linear descriptions are merely too limited to capture their behaviour
accurately.
Change in one of the elements of a dynamic system could lead to many possible
effects across the system [Urry, 2003: 24]. This means that even the
smallest change to the initial conditions of a system can lead to hugely
dispropor-tionate results [Kelly& Allison, 1998: 12]. Causes do not necessarily
lead to effects, and some effects may have a huge influence on the outcome or
the behaviour of the system, whilst others may have none. A par-ticular cause
may also have more than one effect [Rihani, 2002: 7, 68].
Non-linearity is the lIontological principle" [Byrne, 1998: 15] of complexity,
because it has to do with the very nature of complex systems. These systems
are inherently non-linear, and it is through the non-linear interaction of the
elements in these systems that their complexities arise [Cilliers, 2000: 24].
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This implies that it is near impossible to predict the complex behaviour of the
elements in a complex system [Marion, 1999: 5] (see section 4.2.4).
4.3.1.4 ~
Complex systems are known as open systems. An open system is one in "... which
the boundaries permit interaction with their environment" [Kelly & Allison,
1998: 12]. In other words, complex systems interact and communicate with
their environment [Cilliers, 2000: 24].
Take for example a human cell. It has interacting components, and clearly
defined boundaries. It is therefore a system. Nutrients and information can
enter the system from the outside (rest of the body), and waste and
information can exit the system to the environment (outside) [example: Kelly &
Allison, 1998: 12].
In this way, a complex system interacts with its environment across its
boundaries. It becomes "embedded" in its environment [Stroup, 1997: 132],
and is dependent on it. This interaction is very vital for the survival and
evolution of a complex system [Marion, 1999: 81; Luhmann, 2000: 36]. It must
co-exist with its environment, and mutually influence it [Morrison, 2002: 5].
Complex systems can not only take up nutrients and information, they can also
take up and use energy from the environment, and they can also give off
disorder to the environment [Byrne, 1998: 30]. This is known as dissipation.
Energy is dissipated spontaneously through the relationships between the
components of the system [Kelly & Allison, 1998: 4]. The behaviour of the
system can therefore change the environment it acts in. For example, during
the evolution process, plants and animals adapt to their environment, and make
it more hospitable to some and less to others [example: Jervis, 1997: 48].
Closed systems do not allow interaction with the environment. They cannot
change or evolve, and are therefore destined to reach some form of equilibrium
(see section 3.3). This static state is death for the complex system, which
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much interact and evolve to survive. Complex systems, therefore, exist far
from equilibrium9 [Cilliers, 1993: 8-9; Rihoni,2002: 70].
4.3.1.5 $eIf-ortanlsatlon:
A complex system must be able to adapt to changes in the environment. If
some form of perturbation (secondary influence) acts on the system, causing it
to change somehow, it can reorganise itself to adapt to the change (see section
3.2). This is knownas self-orgtlnimtion [Urry, 2003: 98; Morrison, 2002: 7].
Self-organisation also means learning from the perturbation, and evolving
[ByrM, 1998: 30; Kelly & Allison, 1998: 7]. These systems are therefore
sometimes also knownas complex adaptive systems [Rihani, 2002: 7].
According to Kellyand Allison, aI/living and social systems are self-organising,
because they dissipate energy, materials and information from the environment
[Kelly & Allison, 1998: 4]. While it may be too early to claim such
generalisation, it is true that each of these systems is unique in that they
interact with a specific environment at a specific time [Kelly& Allison, 1998:
4].
Also, each living and social system - indeed, each complex system - has a
unique history that constantly affects how it develops and evolves [Cilliers,
1993: 9]. Self-organising systems are able to make an imprint of something
from the environment, and use it later, much as a baby chick's first picture of
its mother becomes imprinted in its memory [Marion, 1999: 71]. This is known
as mapping. Because the system is constantly learning from the change
occurring around and to it, naturally, what has happened in its history can teach
it howto respond to change in the future better.
Self-organisation, therefore, merely means that the system can return itself
to overall stability after change, without any external help [Rihani, 2002: 104;
9 Far from equilibrium: also sometimu called edge of chaos (section 3.5), see for example
Kauffman, 1995.
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Marion, 1999: 7; Lee, 1997: 21]. In this way, a complex system can develop
structure out of what was not structured [Cilliers, 1993: 20]. If the original
stability (structure) of the system becomes unstructured because of
environmental perturbation, the self-organising system is able to reorganise
itself to form a new, evolved structure.
This is not a new concept, though. Even the philosopher Emmanuel Kant
referred to organisms as dynamic and self-organising, almost 200 years ago
[Marion, 1999: 45]. Self-organisation is one of the most important features of
complex systems [price, 1997: 10; Mihata, 1997: 31], for without it, they would
not be able to adapt or evolve.
4.3.1.6 Representation:
The ability of a complex system to self-evolve from within is knownas auto-
catalysis [Morrison, 2002: 15]. To do this, complex systems must be able to
acquire, store and later use information about the environment; i.e., a system
must represent information that is important to it [Cilliers, 1993: 18].
4.3.1.7 Autopolet/c:
Another feature displayed by complex systems is autopoiesis [Price, 1997: 10;
Luhmann, 2000: 38]. An autopoietic system is lIa self-organising system that
creates its own boundaries and preserves and renews itself over timeN[Kellycl
Allison, 1998: 28]. This creation and renewal process involves three actions.
Firstly, the system is self-bounding [Kellycl Allison, 1998: 28; Morrison, 2002:
15], i.e, creating its own boundaries (as to what is inside or outside the system)
[Wolfe, 2000: 180].
Secondly, the system is self-regenerating [Ke"y cl Allison, 1998: 28; Morrison,
2002: 15], which means that it can adapt to its environment and use the
environment's resources to its advantage. And thirdly, it is self-perpetuating
[Ke"y cl A"ison, 1998: 28; Morrison, 2002: 15]; this implies that the system
maintains and renews itself.
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4.3.1.8 Feedback:
One of the most vital properties of a complex system is feedback [Elliott &
Kiel, 1997: 66] (see section 3.2). This is the "action of feeding or reporting
back to the originator of an action the results of that action" [Kelly& Allison,
1998: 14], similar to a customer response to a new product.
A feedback loop is "o series of actions, each of which builds on the results of
the prior action and loops back in 0 circle to affect the original statelI [Kelly&
Allison, 1998: 14; Marion, 1999: xii] (see figure 4.1). There ore many such
feedback loops in a complex system, and they can be direct or indirect [Cilliers,
2000: 24]. Feedback produces global (or overall systemic) patterns through
recursion [Kelly & Allison, 1998: 5] (see section 3.2). "Simple... rules [are]
applied [sequentially] over and over again to the latest results" [Kelly& Allison,
1998: 5to.
All this means is that at some time part of a complex system produced as
output is fed back into the system again to be used as input. This is why even
minute differences at the beginning of a recursion can lead to huge deviations
later on, because the differences accumulate [Kelly& Allison, 1998: 5] (see the
butterfly effect, section 3.1). Change in one element or part of a complex
system can cause change in another, which then affects the original [Jervis,
1997: 125].
Environmental ----I~
inputs
Processing
system
Figure 4.1: Generic open systems theory model (illustrating feedback) {Marion, 1999: 64}
10 See also Anderson, 1999: 218.
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There are two types of feedback: positive or amplifying, and negative or
balancing. Positive (amplifying>feedback is when change inone direction causes
more change in the same direction [Jervis, 1997: 125]. This reinforces the
original state, and leads to growth. For example. when purchases lead to an
increase in the stock market and this in turn leads to more purchases, which
lead to an increase in the stock market etc. etc. [Kelly& Allison,1998: 14].
Negative (balancing> feedback is when change in one direction causes
counteractive change in the opposite direction. This changes the direction of
the original state, and leads to stability and organisation [Kelly& Allison, 1998:
14; Jervis, 1997: 125].
Mostly complex systems use positive feedback, as negative feedback tends to
result in equilibrium (or death). Feedback is very important for the active and
efficient functioning of a complex system [Urry, 2003: 98], although it should
not be taken as rigidly correct all the time, for it can lead to some strange
anomalies.
For example, consider this sequence of feedback: peace leads to war and war
leads to peac« Take the term "peace" as arbitrary starting point: peace leads
to plenty, plenty leads to pride, pride leads to quarrel, quarrel leads to wor. So
peace has led to war! Or take "war" as a starting point: war leads to spoilage,
spoilage leads to poverty, poverty leads to patience, patience leads to peace
[example: Jervis, 1997: 127]. Now war in turn has led to peace! It is almost
possible to force any concept to lead to any other, if feedback is applied in this
(above) way. But, used in the right way, it remains a vital force for any
complex system.
4.3.1.9 Emergence:
Approaching complexity using modernism Is analytical method became a problem
when dealing with complex systems because of the phenomenon of emergence
[Cilliers, 1993: 4-5; Clewley,2004: sec. 2.1]. The complexity displayed by such
a system as a whole does not reside within the individual elements of that
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system. The complexity arises from the dynamic interaction between the
elements [Cornell, 1992: 33]. Each element interacts with many others in the
system, but responds only to information received locally [Cilliers, 1993: 9], i.e.
from its immediate neighbouring elements. In this way, each element can
affect a large number of other elements (indirectly), through a series of
interactions. In other words, the connectivity (between the elements) is
relatively high.
Through this dynamic interaction, "characteristics not inherent within the
individual elements" [Urry, 2003: 13] can emerge spontaneously. These are
known as emergent properties. Something new that emerges from the
interaction between the elements [Mihata, 1997: 31]. These can be behaviours,
qualities or patterns. For example, the flavour of sugar is not inherent in the
carbon, hydrogen or oxygen atoms that make up the sugar molecule [example:
Urry, 2003: 25].
Emergent properties transcend the individual elements of a complex system in
that their complexity cannot be understood by analysing the components in the
system independently [Cilliers, 2000: 24]. What is true for a particular
element in a dynamic system is not necessarily true for the system as a whole.
The system is usually not equal to merely the sum of its parts fUrry, 2003: 24;
Marion, 1999: 29; Smith, 1997: 55]. This is known as non-deducibility. One
cannot deduce emergent properties from the properties of individualelements,
and one cannot deduce general laws from the rules governing individual
elements [Mihata, 1997: 33]. Emergent results are different to and more
powerful than those that could possibly be produced by the elements
individually[Kelly& Allison,1998: 4].
This is why complexity theory is not a reductionist theory. Because of emergence, it is
not possible to reduce a system to the sum of its parts [Byrne, 1998: 14]. Complexity is
instead a holiSfictheory [Byrne, 1998: 35; Marion, 1999: 64, 81; Morrison, 2002: 7,9,
12]: to understand the complex systems, one must lookat the system as a whole [Cilliers,
1993: 17]; how the elements interact to form new properties, how feedback steers the
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system's behaviour in Qspecific direction, Qndhow the system learns from Qndinteracts
with its environment to QdQPtQndevolve.
Complexity theory highlights the boundaries of the reductionist Qpproach concerning
complex systems. This does not mean, however, thQt reductionism is entirely useless; it
may still provide useful understQnding of certain aspects of complex systems.
4.3.2 States of Complex Systems
Complex systems must move though Qnumber of different states to survive. How mQny
states depends on the number of individual elements in the system [Rihani, 2002: 78].
For Qsystem with N number of elements, each which have only two possible states (such
as "on" and "off"), then the number of stQtes the system can move through is equal to
2N• For exQmple, if there ere three elements in Qsystem, i.e, N=3, then there ere 23_
i.e. eight - stQtes. If N=10, then there ere 210 - i.e. 1024 states; Qnd if N=12, there
are 212 - i.e. 4096 - steres.
If, however, each element in the system can hQveone of m possible stetes (not merely
two), then en N element system will havemN states.
It is importQnt for en evolving system to scroll through the right number of stQtes. If
it has too mQnystates, it will develop into completely random (totQIIy chaotic) motion.
If, however, it has too few states, it will lapse into totQI order, equilibrium Qndcertain
death [Rihani, 2002: 80].
A completely chaotic state has en infinite number of stetes. noneof which Qre the same.
The system displays no regularities, and its components hQvevery high connectivity. The
opposite extreme, equilibrium or ordered stQte, is when the system becomes frozen into
fixed activity. The components display very low connectivity.
Organised complexity is what most evolving, adQptive complex systems display. This can
be seen as between organised simplicity (equilibrium) and random chaotic behaviour
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[Marion, 1999: 71~ These types of systems have a large number of similar, but not
identical, states, which are defined by the limits of the particular attractor basin in play
at the time (see section 3.3.1), and they also have (relatively) high connectivity levels.
[Rihani, 2002: 8,78-79,84].
To illustrate these different states, consider water running into a bath with aplughole.
If the tap is closed and the plughole open, there will be order. Nothing flows in and
nothing flows out. Equilibriumsettles in. If one opens the tap widely, the water flow
willeventually become wildand turbulent. It will splash around and it will not be possible
to predict which drops will splash around in the bath, and which will go down the
plughole; neither will it be possible to predict when these drops go down the plughole.
This is chaos. But if the water flows at an even rate out of the tap, a kind of vortex
(whirlpool) is formeet The water flows evenly from the tap, in the bath around the
plughole, and out of the plughole. This pattern will remain for as longas the flow rate is
kept even. This is knownas self-organised complexity [example: Rihani, 2002: 7].
A complex system can move quickly from one state to another. Mostly, these systems
follow a path known as punctuated equilibrium. This means that the system displays
overall global stability - it is "dynamically stable" [Marion, 1999: 59] - punctuated by
large instances of disturbance (or perturbations) [Rihani, 2002: 80]. These
disturbances are most often caused by what are knownas gateway events; events that
lead to the rise of new developments, such as the internal combustion engine that
heralded the start of the industrial revolution, or the personal computer, that launched
the information age [examples: Rihani, 2002: 87~
Gateway events affect the system Is homeostasis, or its tendency to maintain
equilibrium. If the perturbations are dramatic, the system can either return to the
original homeostasis (equilibrium), or it can move on to a new homeostasis (adaptation)
[Marion, 1999: 59~
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4.3.3 The Incompressibility of Complex Systems
Many people, if not most, desire to reduce that which is complex in their world, to
something simpler, or easier to understand. This is an ancient desire [Taylor, 2001:
137], and one of the reasons for the development of and sustained belief in
reductionism. This does not, however, imply that reductionism is equal to simplification;
reductionism is rather a particular type of simplification. Any attempt one makes to
model phenomena is in essence simplification; even if it is a complex systems approach.
Complexity however, as seen above, is holistic; i.e. it cannot be reduced to simpler parts,
because of the phenomenon of emergence. Because it is possible for new and distinct
phenomena to emergence out of the dynamic interaction of the elements of a complex
system, such systems produce complexities not found in their constituent parts.
Because the interactions in complex systems are non-linear, no group of interactions
could be represented by a group smaller than itself [Cilliers, 2000: 27-28; 2001: 3;
Cornell, 1992: 70]. This is known as irreducibility, or incompressibility. Complex
systems cannot be reduced to the individual elements of the system; nor can the
complex behaviour displayed by such systems be reduced to the behaviour of anyone or
more of its elements. The complexity displayed by these systems cannot be compressed
any further.
If one were to reduce a system to something simpler, inevitably one would have to leave
something out. If it were a deterministic or linear system, what was left out would not
present much of a problem, as it would either be unimportant, or contained in the
reduced version of the system. The problem with complex systems, however, is that one
can never predict exactly what the status of that which is left out could be [Cilliers,
2001: 3]. A seemingly inconsequential variation could, as Lorenz discovered, in the long
run cause an enormous difference; something that is unimportant now could become
highly important later.
Consequently, it may often be difficult to deal with and understand complex systems,
because the complexity involves the whole system; one cannot just "leave things out."
This should not, however, dampen one's desire to learn as much as one can from and
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about these extraordinary systems and the behaviours they display. It is also not
always necessary for one to have a perfect model or representation of a complex system
to understand something about it. One can still acquire useful knowledge from
imperfect representations of complex systems. And as much as possible must be learnt
from them, so that we may be another step closer to the understanding of knowledge.
4.3.4 Change
The status of a system depends on the state of the variables (elements) and how that
state came to be (see section 4.2.2). Sometimes changing a variable does not change the
result (or resulting behaviour). Often at least two variables must be modified to affect
the change [Jervis, 1997: 38]. This is because of an effect knownas hysteresis,l1 which
eeuses a delay in the result produced by the changing variable.
The type of change displayed by the system depends of course on what kind of system it
is. A simple, deterministic or linear system will display linear, proportional change that
is ordered and predictable. This kind of system culminates in one solution or result
[Byrne, 1998: 22,26].
On the other hand, a purely random system has an infinite number of possible changes,
which cannot be predicted because of the non-linearity and randomness inherent in the
system. These kinds of systems can produce infinite solutions [Byrne, 1998: 26].
A system displaying self-organised complexity has a range of change between one and
infinity. It can go through any number of non-linear changes, and will produce many
solutions (but a finite number) [Byrne, 1998: 22, 26]. It should be remembered,
however, that complex systems can also display other kinds of behaviour: linearity and
chaos, for example, and that it is not these quolitatiw:1y different [Cilliers, 2000: 24]
behaviours that cannot be predicted - it is possible to knowwhat types of behaviours a
11Hysteresis is "the lag in a variable property of a system with respect to the effect producing it
as this effect varies" [McLeod,1986: 417].
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complex system could produce - rather, it is which behaviour will be displayed at which
point in time that is not predictable.
Change in a system can be internal or external. Internally, change can occur as a result
of interaction between the elements, and externally, between the system and its
environment [Byrne, 1998: 30, 31]. Change can also be complementary - where one side
of the change (exchange) gets stronger, and the other weaker by the same amount -or
symmetrical - where both sides of the exchange get stronger or more hostile at the
same time [Jervis, 1997: 126]. It is also possible for a system to display change that is
a combination of complementary and symmetrical, and likely that it will display a
combination of internal and external change.
Change is necessary in any system that wishes to survi~ and evolve. This is because of
the increasing pressure and uncertainty placed on it because much of its future is
undetermined. The environments in which these evolving systems operate tend to
function at a relatively rapid pace, causing many changes, and many of the old methods
of coping with these changes used in these systems no longer suffice [Kelly& Allison,
1998: 7].
4.3 .5 Prediction
To be able to say that one has acquired knowledge about something is an enormous
accomplishment. Most people desire knowledge so that they may be able to control some
aspect of their circumstances in some way. Much of this control comes with prediction.
If one really could predict the weather properly, with great accuracy, as far in advance
as one wished, not only could one be sure of for example not organising an outdoor
function when it rains, but one might even be able to save lives, by predicting such
disaster events as hurricanes well in adVClnce.
Prediction and control can do man a lot of good if used properly, but first we must
attempt to understand the world around us, before we attempt to control it. This
understanding is now increasingly focused on complex systems, as so many systems one
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comes into contact with today are complex. If a system abides by rules, then one can
control that system. Once the rules are known, the system's behaviour can be
predicted, and once the behaviour can be predicted, the system can be manipulated to
one's benefit [Byrne, 1998: 19,41].
This attempt at understanding and prediction, however, is more difficult than it seems.
Because emergent properties cannot be predicted, complex systems do not lead to
inevitable or expected results [Urry, 2003: 24; Rihani, 2002: 68]. In the linear
paradigm, where systems were at most weakly non-linear, prediction was possible
because, once the universal, deterministic rules governing the system were known, its
(future) behaviour could be determined based on previous behaviour (Rihani, 2002: 66]
(see section 3.1).
But with complex systems this kind of deterministic prediction is only possible in theory.
In practice, it means that infinite precision and accuracy is necessary to predict the
behaviour a complex system will display [Rihani, 2002: 89] (see section 3.1). It may not
be possible to make the kind of quantitative predictions that will determine precisely
what a complex system will do, but it is possible to make relatively accurate qualitative
predictions as to what possible behaviours the system could display.
One cannot predict the system' 5 overall behaviour from the individual behaviours of the
elements in the system (see section 4.2.1 (ix». For example, two individual medicines
(individualelements) that are helpful, when taken separately, for two different ailments
can be potentially fatal if taken together (unpredictable emergent result: fatality)
[example: Jervis, 1997: 39]. The interconnectedness of the elements within a complex
system means that if one changes one aspect or variable in the system it could trigger a
whole series of unanticipated other changes [Jervis, 1997: 61].
Take as an example of this the shutting down of abortion clinics in the 1980's in the
U.S.A. The belief was that if there were fewer clinics, there would be fewer abortions.
Unfortunately, as officials later found out, this transpired to be not the case, as the
abortion clinics also provided "birth control supplies", so the prevalence of abortions
actually increased, due to lack of these supplies [example: Jervis, 1997: 61].
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This does not mean that prediction in complex systems is completely impossible, merely
that is more difficult than in linear systems. Short-term prediction is possible because
a stable relationship between the interacting elements in a system emerges over the
short-term. The overall stability between radical change caused by environmental
perturbations means that, with the local data displayed during times of stability, one can
gather enough information for short-term prediction [Marion, 1999: 149].
There has also recently been one other small success in the prediction of complex
systems. The kind of manipulation mentioned above is not (yet?) possible with these
kinds of systems; however, minor manipulation is possible. At critical points of change
(bifurcation points - see section 3.3.2), when a system must 'decide' which path to
follow, one can introduce some small external disturbance to the system, to force it to
go down the more suitable (or desirable) path, and thereby bring overall stability [Byrne,
1998: 41]. This method is, however, rather limited in its use thus far.
Complex systems are much more complex than they may at first seem. Although
prediction is important, it must be realised that with our (limited) present understanding
of these systems, long-term prediction is not yet possible. It may never be entirely
possible even if we do have a thorough and complete understanding of how complex
systems function. No wonder Saperstein called complexity theory that "... set of
deterministic theories that do not necessarily lead to long-term prediction" [Saperstein,
1997: 105].
4.3.6 Society and Complex Systems
Most social systems can be seen as complex systems because they must adapt and evolve
to survive, and because there exists a high level of interconnectedness between their
elements [Marion. 1999: 41, 100; Lee, 1997: 20]. Social systems are "adaptive
[systems]. .. [that] carry information about their environment and their past" [Marion,
1999: 23]. A social system's history is important for its learning and adaptation; so is
its interaction with its environment.
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Organisms, which can be social or organic systems, II ••• [result] from a self-organising,
self-generating dynamic" [Goodwin, 1994: 197]. They are complex systems, self-
organising, dynamic and autopoietic (see section 4.2.1). Nature, as an organism (or
organic system), is not static and unchanging. It is constantly "active and creetive"
CUrry, 2003: 13]; rebuilding and renewing itself each day, whilst also learning what it
takes to survive, and adapting itself accordingly.
Culture is a complex phenomenon, and the players in a cultural system are complex
individuals. It is often difficult to predict how they will interact, and what complex
reactions change willtrigger (see section 4.2.4).
Cultures have "coherent patterns of human thought" [Kelly& Allison, 1998: 25], which
specify how cultural rules and customs should be reproduced. These are known as
memes, and function in much the same way as genes. Just as genes carry the blueprint
to reproduce life, memes carry the blueprint to reproduce culture [Kelly& Allison, 1998:
27]. These memes can be general (such as national laws) or more specific (such as the
vision inherent in a business strategy), and could be seen as deterministic rules
governing the behaviour of these complex systems in times of punctuated equilibrium
(see section 4.2.2).
Societies are self-referential - they can talk about themselves (or at feast, the people
inside the societies can talk about them) - and they can communicate with or about
their environments. Societies are also autopoietic [Luhmann, 2000: 36,38]. They make
their own boundaries, they regenerate themselves when necessary, and they are self-
perpetuating. Without the people (as their individual elements), these systems would
not be able to survive, adapt or evolve.
Societal habits are "behaviour patterns supported by amplifying feedback loopsll[Kelly&
Allison,1998: 121]. "Organisational boundaries are formed by patterns of communication
and learning behaviourll [Kelly & Allison, 1998: 186]. Societies therefore display
feedback and learning as well.
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Societies and other social systems function as complex systems. In 1970, the most
costly and prized global trade goods were simple products such as clothes, paper, yarn,
meat and coffee [examples: Urry, 2003: 311. By 1995, however, almost two-thirds of
trade commodities worldwide were complex products and processes, such as electronic
components, cyber-architecture and socio-technical systems [examples: Urry, 2003: 31].
With the dawn of the information age, social systems and their accompanying
endeavours such as trade have become even more complex; the products have changed
and the interactions have ehangecj_
This is important for the understanding of the behaviour of these systems and their
individualelements. Predicting their behaviour can become very necessary, and this will
only be possible once one fully understands howcomplex systems work.
4.3.7 Types of Complexity
Complexity (therefore) is displayed in II ... systems that have large numbers of internal
elements that interact locally and non-linearly to produce stable, but evolving, global
patterns" [Rihani, 2002: 6; Urry, 2003: 138]. This means that one can only predict the
global (overall) pattern, not the individual, local interactions [Rihani, 2002: 105]. Order
- as this pattern - emerges naturally out of the dynamic, unpredictable (or chaotic)
interaction of the elements [Marion, 1999: xii; Rihani, 2002: 89].
A complex adaptive system is one "in which interactions give rise dynamically to
emergent phenomena that are resilient in the face of perturbations" [Smith, 1997: 55;
Urry, 2003: 7]. The environment agitates the system through gateway events (see
section 4.2.2), and the system responds by learning from them, adapting, and returning
itself to overall global stability.
There can also be different types of complexity. Algorithmic complexity concerns the
level of complexity displayed by the system. With this kind of complexity, the length of
the message needed to describe a system determines its complexity level [Rihani, 2002:
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88; Elliott & Kiel, 1997: 66; Cilliers, 1993: 16]. Generally, the most common levels are
ordered (equilibrium), chaotic and organised complexity (see section 4.2.2).
According to Cohen and Stewart, "complexity at any given level is a consequence of the
operation of relatively simple rules one level lower down" [Cohen& Stewart, 1994: 219].
If this were so, however, this wouldmean that the complexity of any given level could be
reduced to simplicity on another level. This reductionist view is just what complexity
theorists are against, because this reduction does not account for the emergence of
entirely new phenomena. One can only solve complex problems with complex descriptions
or solutions [Cilliers, 1993: 5, 16]; although not all problems concerning complex systems
are necessari ly complex.
Computational complexity is the "... amount of time... necessary to compute the
description of the system" [Elliott & Kiel, 1997: 66]. Many instances of complex systems
can be seen in everyday life: society structures, culture, organisation, education,
climate, economies etc. [examples (some): Marion, 1999: 25], and the computational
complexity differs for each of these. This kind of complexity also depends on the
frame chosen to represent the system (see section 4.4).
Complexity can also be either active or passive. Active complexity arises from complex
systems that can adapt, ewlve and self-organise, such as organic systems [Cilliers, 1993:
7]. This kind of complexity is "fluid, flexible and adaptable" [Kelly& Allison, 1998: 83].
Passive complexity is the fixed, structural complexity displayed by such complex
systems as the Mandelbrot set (see section 3.3.3) [Cilliers, 1993: 7).
4.3.8 Increasing Levels of Complexity
The figure below indicates the path of how both chaos theory and complexity theory
lead to increasing levels of complexity.
Chaos theory is an example of a theory of simplicity, because it is based on
deterministic equations, and follows certain specific mathematical laws (see figure 4.2).
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This does not mean chaos is simple, neither does it implysimple, predictable results. As
seen above, chaos theory leads one towards ever-increasing complexity and
unpredictability, because of the inherent non-linearities in a chaotic system.
On the other hand, complexity theory is an example of a theory of complexity, because
complex systems are incompressible (see figure 4.2). Due to the dynamic interactions of
the components of a complex system, the complexity of that system increases with the
emergence of unique properties and/or behaviour.
ChaosTheory Complexity Theory
Based on: Deterministic
Equations
Based on: Multiple
Dynamic Interactions
Figure 4.2: Schematic showing how chaos theory and complexity both kod to increased
complexity [EI/iott & Kiel, 1997: 67)
So even though chaos and complexity theories are different types of theories, they
both can lead to increased levels of complexity. This is why (the phenomenon)
103
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
complexity emerges from a combination of chaos (locally) and order (globally) [Rihani,
2002: 70], and why it has been called a "hybrid state ... between stability and chaos"
[Marion, 1999: 23]; the "domain between linearly determined order and indeterminate
chaos" [Byrne, 1998: 1].
The (above) example of a vortex is descriptive of this kind of hybrid state (see section
4.2.2). If something is not completely ordered, this does not mean that it is unordered,
i.e. total random chaos [Byrne, 1998: 16]. Complexity incorporates both.
Both chaos and stability are important for dynamic, evolving systems. Stability is
important for memory and mapping, and chaos forces the system to adapt and breeds
creativity [Marion, 1999: 73]. Self-organising complexity takes place at the edge of
chaos; it is "bounded instabilitY' [Kelly& Allison, 1998: 4, 30]. This means that the
instability caused by perturbations is limited; the system will always eventually go back
to some form of stability, usuallyafter learning and evolution has taken place.
4.4 Complexity and Postmodernism
One of the biggest problems facing modernists attempting to understand complex
systems in an analytic (modernistic) way is prediction. BecQUseof the butterfly effect,
and the phenomenon of emergence, it is clear that prediction in complex systems is a
problem [Ruelle, 1991: 48] (see section 4.2.4). Prediction cannot occur linearly as with
linear, deterministic systems, and neither can one attempt to understanding complex
systems in a linear way [price, 1997: 9]. A different method of understanding - one
that models the complexity of such systems - is necessary. Complexity theory shares
this scepticism of linear methods of understanding with postmodernism.
Because of this difficulty with prediction, it is clear that no universal or "unifying"
description of a complex system can actually exist [Luhmann, 2000: 39]. Each one is
unique, and through the interaction of each one's elements, unique phenomena emerge.
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Thue can also, as noted by LOfgren, be many different descriptions of one particular
complex system, because there are many different facets to an evolving system, and
many different functions. Take society for example. If one looks at a society from a
perspective of freedom, one could define it as conservative, liberal etc. From an
equality point of view,a society could be socialist, communist or democratic. And if one
describes a society based on its level of organisation, it could be an institution, culture
or government [examples: Luhmann,2000: 39].
The scope of the system one decides on depends on the level of detail one requires. The
observer (of the system) picks a "distance" from the system based on what it will be
used for. This is known as framing [Cilliers, 1993: 8; Cornell, 1992: 70]. The above
society distinctions get increasingly larger as the frame is enlarged. In other words,
the observer of society as a system moves further and further away from the system in
order to see it on a more general (less specific) level.
The freedom perspective focuses on the elements - the people - in the system: how
much freedom do they have? Move slightly further away and one can see the society at
an equality level: can the society in general be classified as socialist, communist or
democratic? To view the society on an organisational level, one must move further away
again, so as to see the society as a whole as an institution, culture or government.
So, there are many different levels and many different views of complex systems. The
leveldepends on the frame one chooses. Also any interpretation or description one gives
of a complex system would be from within the framework of one's environment and
history. Such descriptions are therefore always contingent to the person and
circumstance involved. Complexity theory and postmodernism therefore share a
rejection of metanarrative descriptions: all-encompassing, universal descriptions of
phenomena (see section 2.2.2); these are not only undesired, but virtually impossible.
Is it therefore possible that there are some rules not contingent to the person or
circumstance that could guide the evaluation of such knowledge (descriptions)? Chaos
theory has provided some: the self-similarity rate of bifurcations, for example. But
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these universal rules do not do enough to oopture the complexity of complex systems (as
seen above).
But, whereas postmodernism is compldely against universals of any kind (these cannot
exist because reality is subjective and contingent), complexity theory only coincides up
to a rejection of metanarrative descriptions. For complexity theorists, there can be
universals. These are the global properties complex systems produce through the local
interaction between elements [price, 1999: 13].
Complexsystems are constantly learning, adapting and evolving(see section 4.2.1 (ii». It
is important for these systems; otherwise they will stagnate and die. This is because
they are dynamic systems.
Postmodernism is a dynamic theory that focuses on change, diversity and the privileging
of the "other" (see sections 2.1.4 & 2.2.2). Diversity involves not only acknowledging
others and their viewpoints, but also considering them to be at least as equally valid as
your own. With postmodernism, the marginalised "other" minority becomes central or is
made the norm, and the previous majority or "accepted" nowbecomes less important.
Complexity theory oon also be seen as a postmodernist theory because it is against
domination of any kind (see section 2.2.5) [Byrne, 1998: 44-45]; be it one person over
another, society over the individual [Marion, 1999: 304], the accepted over the
unaccepted, or merely one concept over another. Like postmodernism, complexity theory
is concerned with the 10001 context of a phenomenon [Byrne, 1998: 47,51]; in this case,
complex systems: the time and context in which it takes place, its history and memory,
and the individualelements and their interaction.
The disproportions between cause and effect displayed by complex systems (because of
their inherent non-linearities) can also be seen as parallel to the discontinuity
characteristic of postrnodernism [Urry, 2003: 7, 24; Marion, 1999: 6].
Previously, physics scholars coped with complexity by means of equilibrium
thermodynamics. The initial conditions of the system are left out, energy is dissipated
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and disorder is the focus point [prigogine & Stengers, 1984: 129]. Unpredictability
arises when particles interact with random resonance states related to the amount of
potential energy in the particles [Marion, 1999: 148]. This, in addition to the butterfly
effect, causes indeterminacy in a physical system, and therefore uncertainty is a natural
part of non-linear systems, and one should not try to make it more certain.
The problem with this approach is that it does not bring one any closer to understanding
how complex systems work. Non-linear systems may display disorder, but only during
times of upheaval brought about by perturbations or gateway events. Thereafter, they
return to punctuated equilibrium, maintainingglobal stability after evolution.
Some of the complexity that emerges from complex systems may also be missed with
this approach. Without a focus on the interaction between the elements of a complex
system it is not possible to fully understand them. Equilibrium thermodynamics is also
limited mainlyto physical systems, most of which are chaotic, not complex.
Complex systems derive meaning from their interaction. Meaning is a process of
interaction, which is "dialectical" because it involves interaction inside and outside of
the system, and historical because it involves history (see section 4.2.1 (v» [Cilliers,
1993: 29].
When this interaction is obser'Jed, however, it becomes dependent on the observer:
his/her frame of reference, environment, history etc. It is never possible to observe
completely objectively; all knowledge is therefore in some way actually just a
representation of the truth. This is also a postmodernist idea. Knowledge is a
representation (at least in part) of the truth, as viewed by the observer (see section
2.2.5).
This does not mean that truth or all knowledge is relative. Merely that man may not be
able to acquire completely objective knowledge, and often knowledge needs to be
context-specific.
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4.5 Conclusion
The theory of complexity, therefore, is one that feeuses on understanding complex
systems, and how the interaction of elements in such systems can cause entirely new
phenomena to emerge.
Complex systems differ widely, but they all display the same important characteristics.
All complex systems have large numbers of interacting elements. These elements
interact dynamicallyand with non-linearity. Complexsystems are open; i.e. they interact
with the environment, and can self-organise to maintain global stability. And to be able
to adapt and evolve, complex systems must represent the information that is important
to them.
Complexsystems are also knownas autopoietic systems, which means that they are self-
bounding, self-generating and self-perpetuating. They create and maintain themselves.
They also use feedback (mainly positive) to produce global patterns, and display
emergent properties as a result of the dynamic interaction between the system's
elements (see section 4.2.1).
Dynamicsystems 90 through a certain number (mt; of states, which must be the right
number for the type of system to survive. These states can be randomly chaotic,
ordered equilibrium, or organised complexity. Evolvingcomplex systems usually display
organised complexity, where there are a large number of similar, unidentical states.
They also have relatively high connectivity levels.
Complex systems function through punctuated equilibrium, when periods of disturbance
caused by gateway events break up the stability in the system. After these events,
complex systems learn, adapt and evolve, organising themselves into a new states of
temporary stability.
Change is very necessary for complex systems. Because they are dynamic and evolving,
they need to change to learn and adapt. This change can be external or internal, and
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complementary or symmetrical. These systems can go through any number of non-linear
changes (between one and infinity), which cannot be predicted.
Dynamic systems also display non-linear or disproportionate effects. Causes do not
necessarily lead to expected effects, and a particular cause can have one, many or no
effects at all.
Predicting the behaviour of complex systems is difficult, because the dynamic
interaction of the elements leads to emergent behaviour not inherent in the behaviour
of the individualelements [Fitzgerald & van Eijnatten, 2002: 416]. Long-term prediction
is only possible in theory; in practice, it would mean that one could measure initial
conditions with infinite accuracy. Short-term prediction, however, is possible because
of the stable relationships between the elements, and the global patterns complex
systems produce during times of stability (between gateway events) [Cornell, 1992: 70].
Social systems can be seen as complex systems because of their high
interconnectedness levels, and because they must adapt and evolve to survive. The
history of a social system is also important, and these kinds of systems are open, as they
interact with and through their environment. Societies are self-referential and
autopoietic, and display amplifying feedback.
There are different types of complexity. These can be algorithmic or computational,
active or passive, and average complexity increases.
Although chaos theory is similar to complexity theory, it is still based on deterministic
rules. There are certain things about complex systems that chaos theory cannot explain
adequately: the "life" factors, such as memory, adaptation and learning. Complexity is
also more stable than chaos as it maintains global stability through punctuated
equilibrium.
Complexity (as displayed in complex systems) is best seen as a hybrid of order and
chaos, between equilibrium and randomness. Complex systems need both order and
chaos to function, evolve and ultimately survive.
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Complexity theory can be called a postmodern theory because it shares many of
postmodernism's characteristics. It is a dynamic, non-proportionate theory, focuses on
the dynamic, changing nature of systems, and how they display emergence and
disproportionate effects. Postmodernism is also a dynamic theory; it acknowledges
change, diversity and the importance of the "other". Disproportion, or discontinuity, is a
key element of postmodernist systems.
Both complexity theory and postmodernism reject the idea of metanarratives; there can
be no universal, all-encompassing descriptions, although complexity does deviate from
postmodernism by accepting that there can be universals: the complex phenomena that
emerge from the dynamic interaction between stable elements of a complex system.
During the modernist era (polar) opposites were also considered important (see section
3.4). It was vital for structure and stability to have these dualisms clearly defined and
opposed. Complexity theory is very much against this type of distinction, for in complex
systems this kind of boundary is transgressed [Urry, 2003: 96; Rasche & Wolfe, 2000:
17]. One of more important of these distinctions was between order and chaos, stability
and change; as shownabove, these two exist together (see section 4.3).
Postmodernism and complexity theory also have in common the idea that knowledge is
contingent upon the circumstance and observer involved. Observing the "truth" affects
the observer, whilst the observer's environment and history affects his/her perception
of the truth. Truth is not, however, completely relativistic. It may just not be possible
for man to observe or portray truth absolutely objectively.
How, then, can complexity theory help one to understand the nature of knowledge
better? Complexity theory focuses one's attention on the fact that truth is tainted by
the observer, and gives one a much better understanding of howmost systems function.
An understanding of complexity and non-linear systems is important, beeeuse linearity
and the analytical method of understanding are just not adequate enough. To acquire
knowledge one needs to understand complex, non-linear systems, for knowledge displays
the same attributes as these types of systems. It is therefore necessary for an
understanding of the knowledge acquisition process that one understands non-linear
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theories such as complexity theory. Complexity theory provides one with a much better
comprehension of the world as it really is.
More work is also needed on complex systems for our understanding of them and the
phenomena they produce to increase. If one is to be able to understand and model the
process of knowledge acquisition, complex, adaptive systems must be studied in greater
detail.
In an attempt to discover the nature of knowledge and truth, we have discussed chaos
theory as a modernist approach, and complexity theory as a postmodernist approach to
understanding knowledge. Now it is time to seek a solution.
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C""Pt~rS : COlic/aiDa
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis was to discover something about the nature of hUrn<ln
knowledge, and attempt to propose what could be considered a useful and adequate
method of acquiring it, if possible.
How much of what one accepts to be true knowledge is actually an accurate
representation of how things really are? What does it mean to say one has knowledge;
of something specific or in general?
In attempting to answer these questions, chaos and complexity theories were considered
as instances of modernist and postmodernist knowledge frameworks respectively.
Firstly modernism and postmodernism were explored, and then chaos and complexity
were each considered separately.
All that remains is for them to be considered together.
5.2 Comparing Complexity and Chaos
The science of complexity can be seen as the general theory encompassing the non-
linear sciences. Chaos theory is a sub-branch of this complexity science [Lewin, 1993:
12]; one of the non-linear sciences, which studies how deterministic systems displaying
non-linearity can produce chaotic results, and how to understand them. Complexity
theory is another sub-branch of the non-linear sciences, focusing on dynamic, evolving
complex systems, and what is necessary to understand them.
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Scholars disagree on the exact specifications of these (above) sub-disciplines, and
exactly where they fit into the overall framework of complex sciences. Some even
consider complexity theory and chaos theory to be one and the same: however, although
these theories may (in some eases) essentially deal with the same thing (i.e. the complex
behaviours displayed by complex systems), the qualitative behaviours displayed by these
systems can be very different.
Because it is important to have a firm understanding of the subject matter when one
claims to have knowledgeof something, each of chapters two, three and four began with
an in-depth study of the relevant topic. Considering that all knowledge is interpreted
using a framework that involvescertain assumptions, backgrounds and environments, two
specific frameworks for acquiring knowledge were considered in this text. Both chaos
theory and complexity theory are relatively new knowledge frameworks that have arisen
because of the realisation that certain older methods are no longer adequate enough to
ensure valid and accurate knowledge representation.
5.2.1 Chaos and Modernism
Chaotic systems are not random, they follow rules, display order through self-similarity,
and are well-organised, functional systems. They can adapt and may even cause
creativity at critical bifurcation points. It is these bifurcation points, however, that
lead to the misconception that these systems are entirely random (i.e. no order at ali).
Systems that display chaos reach certain critical points where the behaviour of the
system must follow one of two distinct paths. The conditions present within the system
at the point of bifurcation determine which path will be taken. After this point it
becomes impossible to tell which way the system will go, and how it will behave. Its
motion becomes chaotic, always unpredictable, yet always within the boundaries of the
system. It is therefore possible to predict the behaviour of a chaotic system only up to
bifurcation: after that, the only prediction possible is to say that it will stay within the
limits prescribed by the attractors in that particular basin.
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Chaos theory was considered as an instance of knowledge acquisition from within a
modernist framework. This is because chaotic systems follow deterministic, universal
rules; which, if understood, could lead to prediction and control. Chaos theory "... makes
strong claims about the universal behaviour of complexity" (the phenomenon) [Gleick,
1981: 5]. As seen above, however, these rules only afford (quantitative) prediction up
until bifurcation; it wouldtake infinite precision and accuracy to (quantitatively) predict
chaotic movement thereafter (although theoretically, it is possible). One can, however,
predict what qualitative movements will occur; in other words, one can know what
possible behaviours the system could display, but not when they would be displayed.
A modernist framework for understanding demands a certain amount of certainty, for
certainty brings understanding (through its universal nature), which in turn leads to
knowledge, prediction, control, and ultimately, success. For modernism, this is
accomplished through the self (one's own person), which through its own intellect
searches for and discovers knowledge. This provides the self with the power that comes
from control over knowledge;an inherent desire for all human beings.
With chaos, this process is accomplished through the system. The system becomes the
medium through which knowledge is acquired; the system is the will to power - through
control over knowledge. If one can know what the system will do, one can predict its
behaviour; if one can predict its behaviour, one can gain control over the system. This
control brings with it power.
There are, however, some wats in which chaos theory diverges from a modernist
framework of knowledge. Chaos is against dualisms, whilst modernism strongly upholds
them. In chaotic systems, boundaries and oppositions do not nud to be as rigid, as they
can be moved, transgressed or even inverted. Also, chaotic systems do not allow for
modernist reductionism, beeeuse the phenomenon of emergence (present in both chaotic
and complex systems) means that these systems cannot be reduced to the sum of their
individualparts.
Modernism as a framework for the acquisition of true and valid knowledge is much
restrictive. To gain the kind of certainty modernism desires requires that all knowledge
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must be completely objective; otherwise it cannot be considered true or valid. But this
is not possible, as all knowledge is a representation of the truth, tainted by the
background and environment of the person/s involved. Knowledge is affected by the
purporter, and the observation process is influenced by the observer [Rasche & Wolfe,
2000: 21].
Chaos is a less restrictive modernist theory, as it allows for prediction only up to
bifurcation; after that, no one can be certain what the system will do. A chaotic system
does, however, still have to follow all the deterministic rules that govern it.
5.2.2 Complexity and Postmodernism
Complexity theory investigates complex systems, those systems that have a large
number of interacting, highly interconnected elements, and the phenomena and
behaviour they produce. Complex systems are open to their environment; indeed they
create, define and sustain their own boundaries. They are also fully able to maintain
themselves, by learning to adapt and evolve for surviYClI.
Complex systems produce emergent phenomena - phenomena or behaviour not inherent
in the individual elements of the system - through the interaction between the
elements. These phenomena cannot be predicted because of the non-linear nature of
the interactions between the elements.
Through the process of feedback complex systems display self-organised complexity.
This means that they learn and adapt through punctuated equilibrium, incorporating
order and chaos. Gateway events cause large disruptions in the system, from which it
learns, evolves and reorganises itself into a temporary pattern of global stability.
It is these patterns that emerge out of disorder that make temporary prediction of
complex systems possible. During the times of stability between gateway events, the
elements in a complex system exhibit stable relationships. These can be understood and
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used to predict what the system willdo -until the next gateway event. Hereafter, the
system will have evolved, and new stable relationships will have formed.
Complexity theory was considered as an example of postmodern knowledge acquisition.
For complex systems change is important. It fosters the adaptation and evolution
process. Postrnodernism also considers change to be important. Without it, life, society
and development stagnates. And because social systems can be considered complex, it is
important to understand complexity so that one can understand social behaviour better.
Postmodernism considers the individual to be important. No one person should be
privileged above another. The previously hated "other" now becomes at least as valid
and important as the "norm" had been. Diversity and life are to be celebrated, not
condemned, and dualisms can no longer be enforced, for they undermine one another.
Complexity theory also considers the "life" qualities of a system to be important:
memory, adaptation, learning. Without these, the system cannot survive. Dualistic
distinctions between polar opposites no longer exist, because a dynamic, non-linear
system dissolves them. Chaos and order, stability and change exist together within the
system, maintained through punctuated equilibrium.
5.2.3 Complexity, Postmodernismand Relativism
The theories of relativism and postmodernism share a number of commonalities. Both
reject the ideas of metanarratives, and absolutes. Because knowledge is dependent on
the perspective of the viewer - all descriptions are interpretations based on the
viewer'5 circumstances and framework - all knowledge remains a representation of the
truth. Every person's representation willthen differ according to their own framework,
circumstances and history, so there can never be a universal, all-encompassing
description of the universe or of any phenomenon for that matter, because this would
implythat every person has the same perspective, the same circumstances and the same
history I at the same time.
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There can be no metanarratives to describe complex systems either, as this means that
a unified description of all types of complex systems and complexities exists, that is the
same for all people at all times. This is not possible, not only because the complexity of
complex systems is too diverse and unpredictable to lump together under one common
description, but also because once again no two people will view complex systems and
their arising complexities in the same way, at the same time. This is also a postmodern
quality.
There can also never be any absolute truth, because this would mean that it is the same
at all times, in all places, and for all people. But this is not possible, because knowledge
is contingent upon the multi-perspectivity of its observers. Meaning is derived from
interpretation: the interpretation of knowledge in the specific context, through the
specific person's framework. This is something well-known to modernist scientists, for
science progresses on the basis that one does not have absolute truth.
How, then, does one recognise and II ••• acknowledge the contingency of all description and
interpretation" [Rasche & Wolfe, 2000: 9], without falling into relativism? As seen in
chapter two, relativism involves a belief that 6wtrything (every statement, every fact,
every bit of knowledge) is relative to the point of view of the person involved. This
belief is not rationally grounded, as it contradicts itself in many ways; not least of which
the point that any statement therefore has as much validity and truth as any other. So
the statement: 'relativism is false' must be as true as the statement 'relativism is
true'. There is clearly something wrong with a theory that tends towards a
contradiction such as this; unless one does not consider the standards of logic necessary
for a theory's validity.
This said, most theories have something wrong with them, or at least parts that may be
less obvious than others; this does not, however, mean that one should ignore every
possible contribution those theories could make to man's understanding of the world in
general and phenomena in particular.
Also seen in chapter two, Protagorus' answer to this problem, "true-for-mell relativism,
which implies that there is no truth "out there" per se, involves a realist disagreement
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over facts. If this was not so, "true-for-me" relativism wouldmerely be differences in
opinion,and wouldnot pose a problem for the relative claims of knowledge.
This disagreement implies a realist attitude towards the phenomenon in question. 'The
world is round', and 'the world is flat' both implythat there is a phenomenon ('world')
to which they refer, that exists independently of how one perceives it. The 'world',
therefore, must exist "out there" a priori; and truth, then, does exist independently of
one's point of view, although the interpretation thereof remains just that: an
interpretation.
The archie canon (see section 2.3.5) also requires further attention. Is it necessarily
true? The alethic character of relativism means that it is a theory by which one can
understand truth. This implies that relativism is only a theory, one of many ways in
which truth can be understood. If relativism is to be accepted as true, then this
statement (that relativism is only one theory of many) can be viewed from two different
angles.
The first side is that it is only true if accepted from a certain point of view, or for
certain people. Relativism is a theory of truth or knowledge adhered to by some people,
just as realism or scepticism is followed by others. This fits in with relativism's claim
that all points of view are equally valid, and no truth exists independently of one's
perspective..
The other side of the view that relativism is only a theory presents a bit more of a
problem, however. If truth can be understood (which must be possible if relativism is a
theory by which one can do so), then this means that there is something to be
understood. Does this not implythat 'truth' exists independently of howone goes about
understanding it? For if one can take any approach valid for one (from within one's own
perspective) to understand knowledge and truth, then it follows that this knowledge and
truth must exist for one to be able to understand it, especially from any point of view.
By saying that knowledge and truth exists independently of how one views it does not,
however, mean that truth necessarily has a physical existence, that it can be observed
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as an 'object'. Knowledgeand truth are inherent parts of other objects or phenomena,
and do not necessarily have a 'real' existence of their own. What is meant is that truth
or knowledge about some other real object can be gained, because truth is still
independent of the viewone takes towards it.
For example, 'the etlrth is roun,P , is a statement that appears true (based on the latest
available 'evidence') regardless of the perspective one has towards it or of the
phenomenon in question, the earth. The earth is the object that has real existence, but
the truth of the statement about it, 'the etlrth is round', still (appears) true
nevertheless.
Also, the ontic constraint of the archie canon - that the world or reality is unchanging
- must surely implythat this is true regardless of the perspective one has of it. If the
world is unchanging, how can one's perspective of it change it? Yet relativists must
accept this constraint as prerequisite for their theory to work. And as far as absolutes
go, 'the world is unchanging' is definitely an absolute: if one denies this, then one denies
the prerequisite of the ontic constraint, and, essentially, one denies relativism.
There are other such instances of absolute truths that relativists claim (whether
consciously or sub-consciously), such as: 'there can be no absolutes " which put their
theory in jeopardy. If all claims or points of view truly are relative, then such
statements as these cannot exist (or can at least not be considered true or valid).
The strong sociological form of cultural relativism (see section 2.3.5.2) presents one
with more of a moral authoritative problem, rather than an epistemological or ontic one.
If what 8achelard claims is true, that scientific truth is merely what fits in best with
the social policies of that time, then whoever is in charge of those policies ~s to
decide what is scientific truth and what is not. Should this be allowed? How can one
know if the person deciding these 'truths' knowsor even cares what the aetual state of
reality is? If knowledge is merely a representation of truth in part, how can anyone be
qualified to prescribe for others what truth should be?
12 Round: the earth is in fact spherical, but round is used here for continuity with previous
examples.
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This does not, however, mean that all knowledge is entirely relative, merely that our
interpretation thereof is contingent on our point of view. This means that it is not
possible to gain an entirely objective account of knowledge, because any human account
willalways involvenot only human error based on prejudice or misunderstanding, but also
misrepresentation because of personal background, beliefs and environment. Even if the
observer of knowledge is able to be completely objective, there will always be some
aspects he/she will focus on that others would not, and some aspects left out: our
history and our beliefs make us see things in a certain way.
It is therefore always necessary to remember that whatever knowledge is acquired
(from within a framework) should be interpreted from within that same framework. And
that one person's point of view is not necessarily any better or worse than another's.
This suggests that one should take certain notions - such as 'objectivity', for example
- with a certain pinch of salt. Scientists often strive for objectivity, knowingfull well
that it is a near impossible goal [Cornell, 1992: 70]. Perhaps these terms should be
redefined to include that inevitable element of human subjectivism.
5.3 The Quest for Knowledge:
Four years into the 21st century man could be considered to be at his most advanced
concerning knowledge of the world in which he lives. It is logical to expect that this
kind of progress would be reflected in the way people run their lives, interact with one
another, and live in conjunction with the environment. But this is not so. Why is it that
man has all this knowledge, and yet still lives as if he were the only livingthing on this
planet?
It may be merely that human beings ore essentially selfish - or at least ignorant - and
that the furthering of science to gain knowledge is simply to make our own life better.
This is possible. But what is also possible is that much of what is considered human
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knowledge is actually not only incomplete truth, but maybe even be distorted or simply
false versions of the truth.
The intended purpose of the complex sciences varies from person to person, and it is
possible to see how a person's expectations could lead him/her to concentrate research
in a specific direction:
Non-/inetlr sClence{'sj .. aim is to provide the concepts and the techni'lLJes
necessary for a unified description of the particular... cklss of phenomena
whereby simple deterministic systems give rise to complex behaviours... [Nico/is,
1995: xhi]
Unified implies a universal, metanarrative description of non-linear systems. This
attempt at forcing modernist descriptive processes on complexity is limited. There can
be no metaoorrative to describe non-linearity (see section 4.4). But if one expected the
non-linear sciences to function in a modernist way, and provide answers to modernist
questions, then one would consider the above attempt worthwhile: indeed, one would
most likely focus only on that which (could) accomplish this.
Considering the above frameworks: modernist chaos and postmodern complexity: what
does it all mean for the quest for knowledge? As already discussed, knowledge can
never be entirely objective. Also, a linear approach to understanding is very limited, and
willmostly not bring one knowledgeof the world around one. As most social and organic
systems are non-linear, it is with theories that allow for non-linearity that one must
approach understanding of them.
Both chaos and complexity have something important to give to the non-linear approach
to understanding. Chaos provides one with the knowledge that simple rules can cause
chaotic behaviour, and prediction is very limited. Complexity presents one with the birth
of entirely new phenomena not inherent in the individual components, and awakens one to
the intelligent behaviour of the system. Both theories involve a combination of order
and stability, and it is through this organised complexity that a non-linear approach to
understanding should be attempted.
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From chaos theory come the modernist universal rules that make mathematical
understanding of non-linear, complex or chaotic systems easier. And through complexity
theory one can gain insight into the postmodern dynamic, self-organising nature of
everyday systems. As it is knowledge we desire, and knowledge could be sun as a
dynamic, complex system, then "knowledge, as organised information may also be
interpreted as complexity" [Jantsch, 1980: 218].
The global stabi lity that complex systems present through stable element relations
betwun gateway events in punctuated equilibrium also provides man with a way of
understanding what happens when self-organising systems have adapted and evolved.
This can help us understand much about these kinds of systems.
For an example of how chaos and complexity, modernism and postmodernism can and
should work together to assist one with the process of knowledge acquisition, consider
again the general theory of systems (see section 4.2).
Systems theory is a pragmatic theory; it acknowledges that knowledge is contingent
[Rasche & Wolfe, 2000: 16]. This implies that one should be greatly committed to
epistemology: search for the best means of acquiring knowledge. It does not mean one
should disregard it simply because it cannot be 100 percent objective. Knowledgeand
truth can still be real, still be applicable.
Systems theory wishes to describe all systems. However noble this may be, it is most
likely that a metanarrative of systems does not exist, for it is not possible to describe
linear, non-linear, self-organising and chaotic systems together (in the same way).
Systems theory is, however, a theory of knowledge that explains human behaviour
better than many theories - such as modernism - because most social systems are
complex - and chaos theory - because it addresses many different kinds of non-linear
systems. It is against dualisms, and for plurality (or multi-pe.rspectivity), which means
that it could be called a postmodern theory [Rasche & Wolfe, 2000: 17,21].
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Systems theory is against the IIModernist and Enlightenment strategy... of reducing
complexity via social consensus" [Rasche & Wolfe, 2000: 21]. Reductionism is much
limited in supplying useful knowledge about complex systems (because of the
phenomenonof emergence). It is also important to ask why one should desire to simplify
complex systems (or phenomena) merely because some (or all) people do not understand
the complexity displayed by such systems (or phenomena). The human desire to
understand should not cause one to allow the complexity and "life" of complex systems
to be lost or weakened inan attempt to make it more understandable.
It is not always possible for man to understand certain things. Manysuch things become
clearer only later, when humans have in a sense Icaught upI with the complexities of
such phenomena. It does, however, seem possible to bridge the gap between linearity
and postmodernism. If linearity and modernism (i.e. the analytical approach) are
considered the the$is of studying systems, and postrnodernism is the antithesis, then
complexity could be considered a synthesis (see figure 5.1).
Antithesis
Linearity and
Modernism
COMPLEXITY
Fi9urf 5.1: Schematic of complexity as th~ synthesis of reductionism and postmodernism
[Adapt~d from: Byrne, 1998: 44)
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The resulting epistemological framework, with which one can best observe, discover and
interpret knowledge and truth, then, is a non-linear, dynamic theory that incorporates
modernism and postmodernism, and the best of chaos theory and complexity theory.
This framework should mimic complex system behaviour as much es possible, to be able
to goin appropriate insight into the workings of everyday systems, and to account for
the incompressibility of such systems.
A knowledge framework remains just that: a framework. Though it may seem that this
means one can interpret knowledge and truth from within any framework, from any point
of view, this is not entirely so. If the frame of reference one uses to study life and
behaviour around one is not flexible, dynamic and willing to change, grow or even be
rejected if no longer applicable, then one wi" be limited in the knowledge one acquires
through this framework.
One more question on the rood to knowledge remains: is complexity merely ordered
chaos? This hos been suggested by some authors and scientists, and while they do not
claim that chaos and complexity are one and the same thing, they maintain that
complexity is merely the result achieved when chaos becomes ordered.
Out of the discussion of the previous three chapters it is clear that chaos and
complexity ore not the some. What is also clear is that chaos and complexity are two
different behaviour states displayed by non-linear systems. The third of these states is
ordered equilibrium. A dynamic system can display any of these stotes, at any time.
Only truly linear, ordered states exist at equilibrium all the time. To be in a constant
state of equilibriummeans death for the complex system (as seen in chapter 4), beceuse
it hos no chance to adapt and evolve.
Chaotic systems display order only at certain times. This is before the next bifurcation,
when the system settles into a routine of undetermined regularity. Complex systems
maintain order only for a short time: ~tween gateway events. Then their elements ore
in stable relationships; but only until the next disturbance, after which they learn, adopt
and evolve.
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So to say that complexity is merely ordered chaos is not only incorrect, it demonstrates
a complete misunderstanding of what complexity and chaos really are. Chaos cannot
become "ordered", and complexity is not just chaos that has been "smoothed out" and
become regular. Complexity is a whole new experience on its own, and with the birthing
of emergent phenomena, complexity can never merely arise from chaos that has "been
ordered".
5.4 Conclusion
Some authors, such as Urry, consider chaos and complexity to be one and the same
phenomenon [Urry, 2003: 17]. Others view complexity theory merely as a branch of
chaos theory [Marion, 1999: xii].
Although complexity and chaos theories appear very similar, as they both deal with
dynamic systems, and both describe increased levels of complexity (see figure 4.2),
chaos theory is still based on simple, deterministic rules. Because of this, it cannot
describe the complexity generated by the multiple dynamic interactions of complex
systems adequately [Elliott ei Kiel,1997: 67].
If one attempts to analyse social systems using chaos theory, one will miss most of the
"hfe" displayed by these systems: their adaptation, reproduction and evolution [Marion,
1999: 6]. Chaos theory cannot explain the social phenomena of consciousness, memory
and identity [Marion, 1999: 7]. One needs a richer sort of explanation.
Complex systems are also more stable than chaotic systems [Marion, 1999: 7]. Chaotic
systems have little memory because information is lost due to the butterfly effect
[Marion, 1999: 73].
The study of chaos theory should not, however, be discontinued. Chaos theory has
opened the door to understanding and gaining knowledge of a whole range of previously
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unassailable topics. A non-linear understanding of knowledge would perhaps not have
bun possible, or at least very limited, had it not bun for the emergence of chaos
theory. Also, chaos focuses our attention on the fact that the simple and the complex
are not always causa"y or proportionally related. The modernistic universal rules that
appear in systems displaying chaotic behaviour further promote understanding in a non-
linear way.
Complexity theory also provides one with insight into the new phenomena that emerge
out of the interaction of complex systems. The postmodern, self-organising nature of
those systems around one can provide much knowledge necessary to facilitate the
process of understanding.
The studying of the complex sciences, therefore, should:
... be seen not as aiming at a new 'synthetic theory' of complexity of any kind,
but as a cross-disciplinary field of research and meeting place for dialogue
between specialised groups of people such as biologists, physicists, philosophers,
mathematicians, computer scientists, and, last but not least, science writers
[Emmeche, 1997: 43].
These types of systems have shown us that prediction is possible, only that it is limited.
They have also shown us that it is possible to acquire knowledge of phenomena previously
considered too complex, or too random, to understand.
These facts alone should be enough to encourage us to persevere on the road of
discovery. Armed nowwith an integrated modern and postmodern, chaotic and complex,
ordered and non-ordered. systematic non-linear theory of understanding, the fulfi"ing
and successful pursuit of knowledge for the sake of the journey of learning and
understanding is made possible. Towards this we should strive.
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